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EXPERT EVIDENCE AND THE
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AFTER
CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON
Jennifer L. Mnookin*
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, in the landmark case of Crawford v. Washington,1
the Supreme Court dramatically transformed its approach to the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which guarantees
to criminal defendants the right to confront witnesses against
them.2 Prior to Crawford, rather little hearsay evidence was held
to violate the Confrontation Clause. The previous framework for
evaluating the Confrontation Clause, put into place by the 1980
decision in Ohio v. Roberts,3 permitted the use of hearsay in
criminal cases under the Confrontation Clause so long as the
evidence either fell into a “firmly rooted” hearsay exception, or
bore “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”4 As the
jurisprudence developed, nearly all of the hearsay exceptions
were pronounced by the courts to be “firmly rooted,” and in the
relatively unusual circumstance that otherwise admissible
*

Professor, UCLA School of Law. Thanks to Richard Friedman, David
H. Kaye, Kenneth Graham, Lisa Griffin, and Robert Pitler for helpful
conversations, as well as participants in the conference. Portions of Part II
previously appeared in DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E, BERNSTEIN AND JENNIFER
L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE (supplement, 2006).
For helpful research assistance, I thank Hal Melom, Rachel Kleinberg, and
Michael Madigan.
1
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
U.S. CONST, amend VI.
3
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
4
Id. at 66.
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hearsay was not firmly rooted, judges had a great deal of
discretion with which to determine whether the evidence bore
the necessary “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”5
Prior to Crawford, evidence passed Confrontation Clause muster
so long as it was adequately reliable, and reliability could either
be “inferred without more” because the evidence fit into a
longstanding hearsay exception (and hence was firmly rooted),
or, if it did not, courts could analyze the question of reliability
directly, and this reliability determination also answered the
Confrontation Clause inquiry.6
Crawford dramatically refocused the lens for analyzing
Confrontation Clause claims. Jettisoning the Ohio v. Roberts
spotlight on reliability, the opinion substituted an altogether
different inquiry: was the evidence in question “testimonial”—
meaning, roughly, was it made in circumstances that suggested
that it was akin to testimony or would be available for use at
trial?7 If a prior statement is testimonial and the declarant is not
testifying at trial, the hearsay may be introduced against a
criminal defendant only if the declarant is unavailable and the
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the
declarant.8 If the prior statement is not testimonial, then the
Confrontation Clause is not implicated, at least not under the
Federal Constitution.9
While the court in Crawford did not precisely delimit the
boundaries of “testimonial,” it explained in general terms:
Various formulations of this core class of
“testimonial” statements exist: “ex parte in-court
5

Id.
Id.
7
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 37, 53-54.
8
541 U.S. at 53-54.
9
See Davis v. Washington, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2274 (2006) (“We must
decide, therefore, whether the Confrontation Clause applies only to
testimonial hearsay . . . . The answer to the first question was suggested in
Crawford, even if not explicitly held: ‘The text of the Confrontation Clause
reflects this focus [on testimonial hearsay]. . . .’ A limitation so clearly
reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be said to mark
out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.”) (internal citations omitted).
6
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testimony or its functional equivalent—that is,
material such as affidavits, custodial examinations,
prior testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used
prosecutorially;”
“extrajudicial
statements . . .
contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits,
depositions,
prior
testimony,
or
confessions,” “statements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness
reasonably to believe that the statement would be
available for use at a later trial . . .” These
formulations all share a common nucleus and then
define the Clause’s coverage at various levels of
abstraction around it. Regardless of the precise
articulation, some statements qualify under any
definition—for example, ex parte testimony at a
preliminary hearing.10
10

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal citations omitted). Scholars and
courts quickly began to try to define the outer boundaries of the testimonial.
For early efforts, see, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Grappling with the
Meaning of “Testimonial”, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 241 (2005); Richard D.
Friedman, The Confrontation Clause Re-Rooted and Transformed, 2004
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 439; Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington:
Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L.
REV. 511 (2005). This past term, Davis v. Washington offered additional
thoughts on how to identify testimonial hearsay, at least in the context of
statements made in response to interrogation by law enforcement personnel:
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police
interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such
ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the
interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially
relevant to later criminal prosecution.
Davis, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. While Davis explicitly stated that “testimonial”
statements could extend beyond police interrogations, it did not provide any
direct guidance for use in other settings. Id. at 2274 n.1. While Davis does
not, therefore, speak directly to the question of expert evidence under
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Whatever the precise definition, the core idea of
“testimonial” relates to the expected purpose of the statement at
the time of its utterance. Was the statement made in
circumstances that suggest its likely future relevance as
testimony in a criminal prosecution? Often, a statement’s path
from utterance to legal evidence is serendipitous and
unexpected—imagine, for example, that someone reports on her
ate of mind to a friend, and that information later turns out,
surprisingly to both the original speaker and hearer, to be
relevant in a legal case; or suppose that a company, which keeps
its accounts as a matter of course, later finds its business
relevant to a lawsuit. In these circumstances, such statements are
clearly not testimonial as the Court understands the term. By
contrast, if the circumstances in which a given statement was
made suggest that this information is likely to be useful as legal
evidence—if, indeed, to quote Davis v. Washington, the
Supreme Court’s 2006 decision further explicating Crawford in
the context of police interrogations and statements made to 911,
the statement’s “primary purpose” is to generate a statement that
may have later legal relevance, then the statement is clearly
testimonial.11
Obviously, this look to “primary purpose” does not resolve
the question of the boundary of the testimonial; some materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, and formal confessions, clearly
fall inside its perimeter, while others, such as many business
records or most statements made for the purpose of medical
diagnosis will not. Still other statements will fall neither
squarely inside nor outside, and their placement will depend on
how the definition of the testimonial is further honed over time,
as well as assumptions and factual determinations about the
particular statement and its purposes.
Whatever the precise definition of “testimonial,” Crawford
Crawford, its turn to a “primary purpose” test may influence how courts
assess whether laboratory reports and matters upon which experts rely are
testimonial.
11
Id. at 2273-74. Davis limits its attention to statements made in the
course of police interrogation, but it would not be surprising if this “primary
purpose” test were to be extended beyond this application.
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has, without doubt, given additional backbone to the previously
rather spineless operation of the Confrontation Clause. But like
all significant constitutional reinterpretations, it has also raised
as many questions as it has answered, and almost immediately
after the opinion was issued, both courts and legal academics
began wrestling with its implications. Defining the limits of
“testimonial” was obviously an important question: figuring out
which statements fall within the box labeled “testimonial” and
which lie safely outside. Myriad other questions arose as well.
Did the Confrontation Clause prohibit only evidence that fit into
the category of “testimonial,” or was there some residual role
for the earlier approaches with respect to non-testimonial
hearsay? Should the expectation of likely future legal use be
assessed objectively or subjectively, and should it be analyzed
from the vantage point of the declarant, the listener, or both?12
How would Crawford affect particular domains of criminal law,
such as, for example, domestic violence prosecutions, in which
the growing trend towards “evidence-based prosecutions” meant
that typically the prosecution went forward even if the victim
recanted or refused to testify? Was Scalia’s originalist account of
the Confrontation Clause’s history plausible or persuasive?
Courts pondered, academics ruminated, symposia (like this one)
sprouted.
This article focuses on one domain within the post-Crawford
universe that has received rather little academic scrutiny:13 the
12

In Davis, the Court makes clear that the inquiry into whether a
statement is testimonial should be made based on an objective assessment of
the circumstances rather than the subjective intent of the declarant. 126 S. Ct.
at 2273. Davis also states that the focus on testimonial statements reflects
“not merely its ‘core’ but [the] perimeter” of the Confrontation Clause; nontestimonial hearsay therefore does not raise Confrontation problems under the
Federal Constitution. Id. at 2274.
13
Pamela R. Metzger’s recent article is a notable exception, in the
context of certificates of analysis. See Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the
Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475 (2006). See also Bradley Morin, Note,
Science, Crawford and Testimonial Hearsay: Applying the Confrontation
Clause to Laboratory Reports, 85 B.U.L. REV. 1243 (2005); John M. Spires,
Note, Testimonial or Nontestimonial The Admissibility of Forensic Evidence
After Crawford v. Washington, 94 KY. L. J. 187 (2005).
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intersection of expert evidence with the Confrontation Clause.
Crawford was celebrated by some as bringing clarity and
intellectual coherence to an area that had become riddled by both
inconsistency and intellectually unjustifiable legal fictions.14
However, a close look at the area of intersection between expert
testimony and the Confrontation Clause suggests that such
sanguine predictions may have been premature. As I shall show,
the area of expert/Crawford intersection has become a serious
practical concern: a great many lower court opinions have
wrestled with the potential Confrontation Clause implications of
expert evidence that includes statements that might be classified
as testimonial. Most of these courts have endeavored to find
ways around Crawford’s dictates; unfortunately, most of the
arguments proffered by these courts are deeply intellectually
unsatisfying.
Part I of this Article will briefly describe the ways in which
expert evidence issues and the Confrontation Clause tend to
intersect. Part II will describe and critique several arguments
that lower courts have been making in an effort to avoid
restricting these forms of evidence under Crawford. In this
section, my purpose is not to assess the inherent intellectual
legitimacy of Crawford’s approach. Rather, taking Crawford
itself as a given, I wish to examine whether and to what extent
the various approaches taken by lower courts to the problems
related to expert evidence are intellectually justifiable.
Unfortunately, as we shall see, these dominant approaches are,
for the most part, not grounded in a legitimate reading of
Crawford. Finally, Part III will offer some preliminary
suggestions toward intellectually more viable approaches for
evaluating expert evidence under the Confrontation Clause postCrawford, attempting to balance Crawford’s goals and purposes
against the genuine need for the continued availability of
forensic evidence.
14

See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and Formalism in Criminal
Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal
Defendants?, 94 GEO. L. J. 183, 192 (2005) (noting that “The previous case
law had been a mess,” and that “Crawford at least provides a principle and a
coherent inquiry for adjudicating Confrontation Clause disputes.”).
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I. THE INTERSECTION OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CONCERNS
AND EXPERT EVIDENCE
When does the Confrontation Clause intersect with issues
concerning the admissibility and use of expert evidence? There
are two recurring scenarios in which expert evidence may raise
Crawford issues. First, expert evidence is sometimes introduced
without any live testimony at all, through the use of a certificate
of analysis or some other statutorily-approved method for
introducing expert evidence via affidavit. Second, testifying
experts often wish to disclose information upon which they have
relied in order to form their conclusions, and sometimes,
especially in the forensic science setting, this disclosed evidence
may itself constitute testimonial hearsay. This second category
can be further subdivided into two subcategories: first, when
experts reveal tests performed or information provided by other
experts; and second, when experts rely upon information
provided to them by non-experts in circumstances that make the
underlying statements at least arguably testimonial. Each of
these scenarios will be unpacked below in somewhat more
detail.
A. Expert Testimony Without A Witness
In many—indeed, most—jurisdictions, statutes explicitly
permit the introduction of some kinds of routinely generated
expert evidence by forensic scientists without any testimony at
all.15 For example, a prosecutor might be permitted to offer a
certificate of analysis written by a forensic scientist describing
the evidence that was tested, the analyses that were done, and
the conclusions reached. These statutes hand to prosecutors the
option of proving key forensic facts by document in lieu of live
testimony. Some states permit certificates of analysis only in
15

For a useful description of the widespread use of certificates of
analysis and the constitutional problems they generate, see Metzger, supra
note 13. According to Metzger, all but six jurisdictions in the United States
have some kind of statute permitting certificates of analysis in at least some
circumstances. Id. at 478.
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particular instances, such as to prove the results of a blood or
breath alcohol tests, or to establish that the breath detection
machine used was properly calibrated, or to disclose the
chemical composition of possible narcotics, but other states
permit the use of such certificates for any tests conducted by
forensic scientists.16
Practically speaking, these statutes mean that the fact that a
substance found on the defendant’s person was tested and
determined to be cocaine of a specified quantity might, at the
prosecutor’s prerogative, be proven by waving an officiallooking paper that says so before the jury, rather than presenting
live testimony subject to cross examination. In those states that
permit very broad use of certificates of analysis, written
evidence without live testimony might even be used to establish
matters such as the conclusion that the casings found at the
crime scene match the gun found in the defendant’s nightstand,
or the determination that the defendant’s fingerprint or DNA
matched the evidence located at the scene. When a certificate of
analysis is used, the written statement may wholly substitute for
putting a witness on the stand.
Nearly half of those states that permit certificates of analysis
require the prosecutors to provide the defense with advance
notice of an intent to use a certificate of analysis, and many (but
by no means all of these states) do have opt-out provisions that
allow the defendant to insist that the state offer live testimony in
lieu of the certificate. However, some of these opt-out
provisions are quite narrowly drawn, often requiring the defense
to do something more than simply make the demand for the
opportunity for confrontation. Take, for example, Alabama’s
statute, which requires defense counsel not only to certify a
16

While many states restrict the use of certificates of analysis to
particular circumstances, typically the identification of a controlled substance
or matters relating to DUI, such as breath alcohol test results and calibration
records, several state statutes permit essentially all laboratory reports or
forensic science findings to be admitted via certificate. For examples of the
latter, see, e.g., Ala. Code §12-21-300 (2006); Ark. Code Ann. §12-12-313
(2006); Iowa Code. §691.2 (2006); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. Art. 38.41
(Vernon 2006); Va. Code Ann. §19.2-187 (2006).
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good-faith intent to cross-examine the witness at trial, but also to
alert the court to the “basis upon which the requesting party
intends to challenge the findings.”17
The Confrontation Clause issues potentially raised by the use
of certificates of analysis are obvious.18 If these certificates are
testimonial, then the use of paper evidence instead of live
testimony by witnesses violates the Confrontation Clause unless
the declarant is unavailable and the defense had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination. Apart from retrials after a
successful appeal or a hung jury, it is unlikely that the defendant
would have had such an opportunity. So in the vast bulk of
cases, the only way that these statutes can pass constitutional
muster post-Crawford is if either (1) the evidence is not
considered to be testimonial; or (2) if, in the minority of states
that require advance notice to the defendant and permit some
kind of opt-out procedure, the defendant’s failure to invoke the
available pre-trial mechanisms to challenge the prosecution’s use
of a certificate is understood as a legitimate waiver of her
Confrontation Clause rights.19
17

Ala. Code. §12-21-302.
For an important early article on the Confrontation Clause issues
relating to the use of such certificates, see Paul C. Giannelli, Expert
Testimony and the Confrontation Clause, 22 CAP. U. L. REV. 45, 84 (1993).
For the most detailed post-Crawford analysis, see Metzger, supra note 13.
19
There are several courts that have held that such opt-out procedures
make the use of certificates of analysis permissible under Crawford. See,
e.g., City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203 (Nev. 2005). The opt-out
provision at issue in Walsh required the defendant to establish to the court’s
satisfaction that “(a) There is a substantial and bona fide dispute regarding
the facts in the affidavit or declaration; and (b) It is in the best interests of
justice that the witness who signed the affidavit or declaration be crossexamined.” This, to my mind, is deeply problematic: exercising the
Confrontation right should not require as a prerequisite that the defendant
persuade the Court that she has a sufficiently valuable reason for doing so.
Though careful discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this Article,
assuming (as I argue), that the content of a certificate of analysis is properly
understood as testimonial and hence is within Crawford’s purview, surely the
statutes that require either a good faith basis for cross-examination or even a
good faith intent to cross-examine ought to be seen as constitutionally
problematic. Some courts have made the still more disturbing argument that
18
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Certainly, a straightforward analysis of these certificates
would suggest that they are testimonial. After all, their central
purpose is precisely to substitute for live testimony at trial. That
is, in fact, their very raison d’etre: the whole idea of the
certificates is to be used in lieu of the testimony that would
otherwise be necessary. Even if “testimonial” evidence were
defined as narrowly as possible, it is difficult to see how
certificates of analysis could fall outside the definition. They are
indeed a kind of “ex parte in court testimony,” a form of
“formalized testimonial materials,” in essence, a form of
affidavit.20 It is almost unimaginable that a principled way could
be found to distinguish them as a category from other kinds of
clearly testimonial statements.
Nonetheless, as Part II will illustrate, many courts are
rejecting this straightforward analysis and attempting to find
some way to preserve the use of these certificates
notwithstanding Crawford. While these arguments will be
detailed in the following Part, it is worth noting at the outset
that if Crawford were interpreted to bar the use of certificates of
analysis, it would be an inconvenience for prosecutors,
certainly, but it would be unlikely to create insurmountable
obstacles to the introduction of the underlying evidence.
because the defendant could subpoena the author of the laboratory report at
no cost if she chose to, the state may use a certificate in lieu of calling a
witness to the stand. See, e.g., State v. Campbell, 719 N.W.2d 374 (N.D.
2006). This form of burden-shifting offers an extremely weak form of
protection of the Confrontation right, and is difficult to reconcile with
Crawford’s emphasis.
However, this does not mean that all forms of routine waivers ought to
be prohibited. While it is true that even a statute that requires a defendant to
object to the prosecution’s planned use of a certificate is not cost-free for a
defendant, a simple demand requirement, in which the defendant need not
give a reason, persuade the court, or have a lawyer affirm any actual intent
to cross-examine, might offer a reasonable way to balance efficiency
concerns against the protection of the defendant’s opportunity to crossexamine. Careful consideration of the legitimacy of waiver options is,
however, beyond the scope of this Article. In Part II, I focus instead on the
question of whether certificates of analysis are properly understood as
testimonial.
20
See the variety of definitions on offer in Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
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Certificates of analysis are, in essence, a shortcut to the process
of proof, so prohibiting them would force the prosecutor to take
the long way around. But it would not do more than that.
Removing a shortcut would increase costs and this in turn might
to some extent affect the balance of power between defendant
and prosecutor, which might in turn have some affect on each
party’s willingness to negotiate or the precise terms of plea
bargains. Eliminating or curtailing the use of certificates of
analysis would obviously increase the costs of prosecution to
some extent; that, of course, is generally true of any increase in
constitutional protection afforded to defendants. But abolishing
or restricting them would be unlikely to cause massive logistical
or practical problems. Strong evidence on this point is provided
by a simple fact: at present, several states (including the most
populous state, California) do not permit the use of certificates
of analysis at all, and yet the criminal trial process in these
jurisdictions does somehow manage to function. In addition,
even if certificates of analysis are properly understood to be
testimonial, it might be possible to develop constitutionally
permissible waiver procedures under which their use would be
allowed unless the defendant opted out of permitting the state to
use them.
B. Expert Basis Evidence
Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permits experts to
rely upon inadmissible evidence “if of a type reasonably relied
upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or
inferences upon the subject,” and most states have similar
provisions.21 This Rule means that the information that helps
shape or form the expert opinion does not itself need to be
admissible in evidence, so long as it is the kind of information
that experts in the field would typically use for reaching
conclusions or opinions like this one. The logic justifying the
rule is essentially a form of deference to legitimate expertise: if
the expert herself can assess whether a particular piece of
21

FED. R. EVID. 703.
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information is worth being considered as part of the basis for
her conclusion, why should the court second-guess this judgment
by the expert, especially if it is a judgment that conforms with
the customary norms of the expert’s community?22
A related but distinct question is whether an expert may
disclose the information upon which she has relied to form her
opinion to the jury, even if that information is itself otherwise
inadmissible. The strongest argument in favor of disclosure is to
create the possibility for educating the jury by making the
expert’s conclusion and reasoning more transparent. If the jury
does not know the underlying facts or bases for an expert’s
conclusions, it is difficult to see how the jury could rationally
assess the plausibility of the expert’s judgment. Without such
disclosure, the jury may have little choice but to defer (or not)
to an expert’s credentials, and to assess her demeanor rather
than unpack her arguments. Without disclosure, the jury may
lack the fundamental building blocks that could permit it to
evaluate the substantive merits of the expert’s conclusion.23 If
we want to encourage, or indeed even permit, rational
evaluation of an expert’s conclusions by the jury, permitting the
disclosure of basis evidence would appear to be a very good
idea.
However, this strong argument in favor of permitting
disclosure is matched by an equally strong argument against it:
if disclosure is permitted, it is likely to become a mechanism by
which savvy lawyers funnel otherwise inadmissible hearsay
evidence to the jury. Permitting disclosure of all matters upon
which an expert has reasonably relied would risk opening the
door to a great deal of hearsay evidence, and could turn the
expert into a conduit for large quantities of otherwise
inadmissible, and potentially prejudicial, information. At an
extreme, parties might even introduce an expert precisely for the
purpose of getting before the jury evidence that would otherwise

22

See generally Advisory Committee Note, FED. R. EVID. 703.
See generally Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law
Theory of Experts: Deference or Education, 87 NW. L. REV. 1131 (1993).
23
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be prohibited.24
In short, so long as experts may rely on inadmissible factual
matters as the bases for their conclusion, there is an inevitable
tension between jury education and adherence to the rest of the
rules of evidence.25 In practice, the dominant approach has been
to permit disclosure of an expert’s basis evidence subject to a
balancing test.26 Prior to the year 2000, many courts applied that
Rule 403 balancing test so familiar to every student of evidence,
and looked to whether the probative value of disclosure was
“substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
24

There has been significant scholarly discussion of this issue. See, e.g.,
Ronald L. Carlson, Collision Course in Expert Testimony: Limitations on
Affirmative Introduction of Underlying Data, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 234 (1984);
Ronald L. Carlson, Experts as Hearsay Conduits: Confrontation Abuses in
Opinion Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 859 (1992); Ronald L. Carlson,
Experts, Judges and Commentators, The Underlying Debate About an
Expert’s Underlying Data, 4 MERCER L. REV. 481 (1996); Ronald L.
Carlson, Is Revised Expert Witness Rule 703 a Critical Modernization for the
New Century, 52 FLA. L. REV. 715 (2000); Ronald L. Carlson, Policing the
Bases of Modern Expert Testimony, 39 VAND. L. REV. 577 (1986); Joanne
A. Epps, Clarifying the Meaning of Federal Rule of Evidence 703, 36 B.C.
L. REV. 53 (1994); David L. Faigman, Struggling to Stop the Flood of
Unreliable Expert Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 877 (1992); Edward J.
Imwinkelried, Developing a Coherent Theory of the Structure of Federal Rule
of Evidence 703, 47 MERCER L. REV. 447 (1996); L. Timothy Perrin, Expert
Witnesses Under Rule 703 and 803 (4) of the Federal Rules of Evidence:
Separating the Wheat from the Chaff, 72 IND. L. J. 939 (1997); Peter J.
Rescorl, Fed. R. Evid. 703, A Back Door Entrance for Hearsay and Other
Inadmissible Evidence: A Time for Change, 63 TEMP L. REV. 543 (1990);
Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert Testimony: A
Reply to Professor Carlson, 40 VAND. L. REV. 483 (1987); Paul R. Rice,
The Allure of the Illogic: A Coherent Solution for Rule 703 Requires More
than Redefining “Facts or Data”, 47 MERCER L. REV. 495 (1996); Charles J.
Walsh & Beth S. Rose, Increasing the Useful Information Provided by
Experts in the Courtroom: A Comparison of Federal Rules of Evidence 703
and 803(18) in Illinois, Ohio, and New York, 26 SETON HALL. L. REV. 183
(1995).
25
For further discussion of this issue, see DAVID KAYE, DAVID
BERNSTEIN, AND JENNIFER MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A TREATISE ON
EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE §3.7 (2004).
26
See generally id.
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confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”27 In 2000,
Federal Rule of Evidence 705 was amended to address
concretely the issue of disclosure, and reversed the Rule 403
balancing test, making non-disclosure the default, unless the
probative value of disclosure substantially outweighs the harm of
non-disclosure.28 A few states have followed the federal rule,
but most have not amended their equivalent state rule, and at
present disclosure practices vary significantly across
jurisdictions.29 Notwithstanding Rule 705 and the existence of
rules of some kind on this point in many states, on-the-ground
practices with respect to the extent of expert disclosures vary
tremendously, even within jurisdictions, and are typically not
very closely regulated by appellate courts.
As the cases concerning Crawford and expert evidence
themselves reveal, however, there is no doubt that a great deal
of expert basis evidence is regularly being disclosed to juries—
and it is this disclosure that potentially raises the Confrontation
Clause concern. When an expert details the statements made by
an out-of-court declarant, the defendant does not have the
chance to cross-examine the witness whose statements are
relayed to the jury. To be sure, it is frequently the case that the
hearsay basis for an expert’s testimony will not be testimonial
under any reasonable definition of the term. When a doctor
relies on other medical records made in the course of treatment,
or an appraiser relies on comparable prior sales, or an expert in
27

FED. R. EVID. 403. For cases articulating this standard, see, e.g.,
Guillory v. Dontar Indus. 95 F. 3d 1320, 1331 (5th Cir. 1996); Gong v.
Hirsch, 913 F. 2d 1269, 1273 (7th Cir. 1990).
28
Federal Rule of Evidence 705 now reads, “Facts or data that are
otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the proponent of
the opinion or inference unless the courts determine that their probative value
in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert’s opinion substantially outweighs
their prejudicial effect.” A few states have followed suit, but many have left
their equivalent rules unchanged. See Kaye et al, supra note 23 at §3.8.2.
29
To give an example, Pennsylvania and Rhode Island make disclosure
of the basis of an expert opinion both admissible and mandatory, whereas
Minnesota restricts disclosure to civil cases and even then only permits it
when “the underlying data is particularly trustworthy.” See Pa. R. Evid.,
704; R.E. R. Evid. 703; and Minn. R. Evid. 703.
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gang structure relies on interviews conducted with former gang
members over many years and not related to the particular case,
no plausible understanding of “testimonial” would encompass
these statements. They were not made in circumstances that
would suggest that they were going to be used in a trial as a
substitute for live testimony, nor were they spoken with the
expectation that they would be used to prove some fact in court.
However, in other circumstances, a portion of an expert’s
basis may well fit within the category of “testimonial.” While
the variety of potential circumstances is great, two recurring
categories of evidence that are implicated by Crawford are
described briefly below: a testifying expert’s description of the
findings of other forensic experts; and an expert’s disclosure of
statements learned during the process of investigating the case.
Note that there may be a Crawford problem even when there
is no problem with disclosure under Rules 703 and 705. In some
cases, the matters upon which experts rely may be hearsay that
is admissible under some other exception. Prior to Crawford,
disclosure of this evidence would not have been problematic
(unless the hearsay exception that applied was not firmly rooted,
in which case a reliability analysis would have been necessary if
the evidence was understood to have been introduced
substantively for the truth of its contents). But Crawford changes
this analysis: even if the basis evidence fits into some legitimate
hearsay exception, while it does not fall into Rule 705’s
limitations on disclosure (or any state equivalent), if the
underlying evidence is testimonial, it may still be barred by
Crawford. Moreover, even in those states that have heretofore
permitted or even required disclosure of an expert’s basis on
direct testimony, if the disclosure is testimonial, the
Confrontation Clause must obviously trump.
1. Experts Reporting the Case-Specific Findings of Other
Experts
On many occasions, the forensic expert who testifies in court
is not the person who actually conducted the forensic tests in the
case. One person might carry out a toxicological analysis, a
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DNA test, or an autopsy, while an altogether different person
stands before the jury to provide testimony, often another
employee in the same laboratory. Sometimes the testifying
witness is the original analysts’ supervisor or successor, or it
might just be the staff member who happened to be free to come
to court that day, or perhaps the person already testifying in
some other case that day and hence conveniently available to do
double duty; or possibly it is whichever laboratory analyst is
thought to be best at testifying before the jury. Typically, this
testifying witness’s conclusions derive primarily from looking
over the laboratory results of the non-testifying expert. In such a
circumstance, courts often permit the testifying witness to
describe in detail the tests conducted by others, and frequently
also permit the actual test reports themselves to be formally
introduced into evidence and presented to the jury.
The potential Crawford issues are clear. If an expert testifies
about tests she has personally conducted, there is obviously no
Confrontation Clause problem: the expert is on the stand and
available for cross-examination. But when an expert reports to
the jury detail and substance of tests conducted by others, is she
relaying constitutionally prohibited testimonial hearsay? In order
to permit such testimony, a court would need to be able
legitimately to claim that the evidence was either not hearsay or
not testimonial. Otherwise, Crawford would bar such
disclosures, unless either the expert who actually conducted the
tests was also testifying, or the original expert was unavailable
and the defendant had been afforded a prior opportunity to
cross-examine.
As with certificates of analysis, a straight-faced reading of
Crawford seems to make it difficult to avoid the conclusion that
at least some of this expert basis evidence is testimonial. In the
next Part, I will explore in some detail why it is not plausible to
conclude that expert basis evidence of this sort is not hearsay.30
And certainly these reports are produced in clear contemplation
of future legal proceedings. Unlike certificates of analysis,
which are truly intended to substitute for testimony, with
30

See generally Part II.
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forensic science reports of these kinds it is frequently
contemplated that someone’s testimony will accompany the
report.31 But if it is not the declarant herself who testifies, then
the report is certainly operating as “ex parte in court
testimony.”
It is worth noting that, were Crawford construed to apply to
these situations, most of the time it would be a logistical
inconvenience for the prosecution but not an insurmountable
problem. Much of the time, it would be feasible to introduce
forensic science testimony through the particular forensic
scientist who conducted the test. It might put pressure on
laboratories to hire only those forensic scientists who had
appealing courtroom demeanors, and it might frequently be
inconvenient—imagine for example a number of small-scale drug
trials happening the same day, for which it would be far easier
to send one person to court rather than the four different people
who had conducted the actual tests at issue.
Sometimes, however, compliance would be more than an
inconvenience. When the original author of the report was
genuinely unavailable, Crawford’s dictates could pose a serious
problem of proof. Any time a forensic scientist quit her job,
moved to another state, or died, there would be a backlog of
cases for which she had done the tests but that had not yet gone
to trial—how would these tests now be introduced into evidence?
Particularly in those areas where there is frequently a long lag
time between forensic examination and prosecution—take murder
cases, for example, in which many years might regularly
separate the autopsy and arrest, much less the trial itself—
Crawford’s requirements could create severe difficulties if no
work-around was available.

31

Note, however, that in some jurisdictions, forensic science reports are
regularly introduced without accompanying testimony, accompanied by some
certification, the details of which depend on the state. See Metzger, supra
note 13 at 486-88 and accompanying notes.
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2. Expert Disclosures of Non-Expert Basis Evidence

Crawford concerns can also arise in those cases in which
experts testifying on behalf of the prosecution have interviewed
subjects in the course of gathering information and preparing
their testimony for the particular case. Imagine, for example,
that a forensic psychologist interviews friends and relatives of
the defendant about her behavior around the time of the crime in
order to assist in her assessment of the defendant’s sanity. Or, in
a criminal case arising from a vehicular accident, an accident
reconstruction expert might base his opinion partly on affidavits
made by witnesses to the authorities, or might go out herself to
conduct interviews with onlookers. A gang expert might
examine statements made by suspects under interrogation, or
might conduct interviews with former gang members to learn
more about operational details of the gang to which the
defendant is thought to belong.
Myriad additional examples could be generated; the point is
that when an expert retained by the prosecution gathers
statements from people who know that she is an expert retained
by the prosecution, or uses statements gathered by the police,
these statements may quite possibly fall within the boundaries of
the testimonial. If so, then any expert disclosure of the substance
of these statements might also run afoul of Crawford. Note,
however, that whether basis evidence of this sort is testimonial
is a closer question than the earlier two categories, because it is
typically less formalized, and depending on the circumstances, it
might, from the declarant’s perspective, not be as obviously
made in anticipation of litigation or understood to be a potential
substitute for testimony. If, as the definition of testimonial is
further honed, the “formalized” nature of the statements is
thought to be central, then some utterances of these sorts might
be outside the definition’s boundaries. By contrast, if the key
question is whether either a reasonable listener or declarant
would have expected the information to be used prosecutorially,
then these kinds of expert basis evidence would often be
testimonial.
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How much of a practical impediment would it be to bar
these kinds of disclosure by experts? In some circumstances, the
underlying evidence upon which the expert relies might be
independently admissible. Obviously if the same individuals
upon whom the expert relies are also testifying and hence
available for cross-examination, this cures any potential
Crawford problem. In other instances, experts might be
permitted to rely upon such evidence but not disclose it—an
expert might explain to the jury that her conclusions about the
gang structure were based in part on transcripts of an
interrogation by the police with other gang members, without
describing the details of what these interrogations revealed.
This, to be sure, gives the jury less information with which to
substantively evaluate the expert’s conclusion; it pushes the jury
further toward the deference pole of the deference/education
axis. It also raises the intriguing question of whether the logic of
Crawford places any limitations on the reliance upon testimonial
evidence, or simply limits its in-court disclosure, but serious
discussion of this question is beyond the scope of this Article.
II. AVOIDING REALITY: COURTS’ EFFORTS TO CATEGORIZE
EXPERT BASIS EVIDENCE AND CERTIFICATES OF ANALYSIS AS
NON-TESTIMONIAL
Prior to Crawford, most cases downplayed any Confrontation
Clause concerns wrought by expert reliance upon or disclosure
of hearsay, or by the use of certificates of analysis.32 Some of
the arguments typically proffered by courts included the
following: (1) when the evidence is admitted for the limited
purpose of helping the jury evaluate the expert’s basis, it is not
offered for the truth of its contents and hence, because it is not
hearsay, the Confrontation Clause is not implicated; (2)
frequently, the facts disclosed by the expert are such that the
32

A few courts did find such testimony to violate the Sixth Amendment.
See, e.g., State v. Towne, 453 A.2d 1133 (Vt. 1982) (finding that expert’s
testimony that another non-testifying doctor agreed with him, coupled with
prosecutor’s emphasis of this point, amounted to a violation of defendant’s
confrontation rights).
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assistance to the defendant from confrontation would have been
limited; (3) the availability of a testifying expert for crossexamination is an adequate substitute for cross-examining the
hearsay declarant; and (4) because the basis for allowing the
expert’s reliance under Rule 703 is reliability, the disclosed
information should also be deemed reliable enough to eliminate
Confrontation Clause concerns.33 Some courts even tried to
argue that that reliance on factual matters by an expert under
Rule 703 was a firmly rooted hearsay exception.34 Given that
Rule 703 is not explicitly framed as a hearsay exception at all,
this argument was especially persuasive.35
In the two years since Crawford, many state and federal
courts have confronted cases involving expert reliance upon and
disclosure of matters that are at least arguably testimonial, as
well as numerous cases involving the continued use, postCrawford, of certificates of analysis. A handful of courts have
concluded, sometimes reluctantly, that Crawford bars the use or
disclosure of such evidence. Most of the time, however, courts
have held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar either
disclosure by experts or the use of certificates of analysis.
33

See, e.g., Barrett v. Acevedo, 169 F. 3d 1155 (8th Cir. 1999)
(suggesting that disclosure of basis was for a purpose other than the truth of
its contents and hence neither hearsay nor a violation of the Confrontation
Clause); Reardon v. Manson, 806 F. 2d 39 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding sufficient
indicia of reliability to justify use and disclosure of hearsay by expert and
emphasizing defendant’s opportunity to cross-examine expert).
34
See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 299 F.3d 1252 (11th Cir. 2002)
(finding expert’s reliance on hearsay to be “firmly rooted” for confrontation
clause purposes); State v. Hutto, 481 S.E.2d 432 (S.C. 1997) (same).
35
As State v. Rogovich, 932 P.2d 794 (Ariz. 1997), correctly noted,
“[b]ecause Rule 703 is not a hearsay exception . . . it is certainly not firmly
rooted.” Id. at 798. Rule 803, the federal rule against hearsay, makes
hearsay inadmissible “except as provided by these rules or other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.” One could
argue that Rule 703 and Rule 705, which, prior to their amendment in 2000,
implicitly permitted disclosure at least some of the time, were “other rules”
under Rule 803, and thus, they operated as a legitimate hearsay exception.
This argument is strained but not wholly preposterous; however, even if these
rules created an implicit hearsay exception, it would be difficult to claim with
a straight face that it was a firmly-rooted one.
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Perhaps surprisingly, many courts have continued to make
precisely the same arguments that they made prior to Crawford.
A close look at several of the arguments mustered by the
courts who deem such evidence non-testimonial or otherwise
find Crawford inapplicable shows them to be generally
unpersuasive, sometimes even disingenuous. Even if reliance on
testimonial evidence by experts continues to be permissible
under Crawford, it is difficult to justify disclosure of this
testimonial basis to the factfinder. In this section, I will describe
and evaluate the stratagems by which state and federal courts are
attempting to limit Crawford’s applicability to forms of expert
evidence. I will give particular attention to the argument that an
expert’s factual basis disclosures are not hearsay at all, for this
claim is an especially tempting, though in my view unjustifiable,
way for courts to avoid creating a Crawford problem.
A. The Evidence is Introduced for a Non-Hearsay Purpose
Prior to Crawford, many courts permitted experts to describe
the substance of the sources upon which they relied, arguing that
not only were there no Confrontation Clause issues at stake in
such disclosures, but that these disclosures were actually not
even hearsay at all. This issue commonly arose when courts had
to decide whether to permit experts to disclose matters upon
which they relied, but that were not independently admissible
under some hearsay exception. As I described in Part I, Rule
703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence explicitly permits experts
to rely upon inadmissible evidence “if of a type reasonably
relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions
or inferences upon the subject,” and most state evidence rules
contain similar provisions.36 When an expert relies on
inadmissible evidence that fits the confines of the rule, can she
tell the jury about the basis for her conclusions? Can she
disclose this otherwise inadmissible evidence to them?
Certainly, prior to Crawford and the revisions to Rule 705
that shifted the balancing testing federal court to favor non36

FED. R. EVID. 703.
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disclosure, courts were regularly in the habit of permitting
experts to disclose the factual foundation for their conclusions.
When such evidence was admitted, it led to a related question:
what, precisely, was the evidentiary status of this disclosed
foundation? Once disclosed, was it formally “in evidence” for
all purposes, including to prove the truth of its contents? Or,
was it available only for some more limited purpose, and if so,
what might this purpose be? One approach taken by courts—and
which some courts are continuing to employ, even after
Crawford—was to suggest that the disclosure of the expert’s
basis was actually permitted not for the truth of its contents, but
only for a more limited purpose: to help the jury assess the
expert’s opinions and conclusions.
Rules of limited admissibility are commonplace in evidence
law. They inevitably invite questions about whether they actually
work—whether it is plausible to believe factfinders capable of
the mental gymnastics necessary to consider a piece of proffered
information for one purpose while wiping it clear out of their
minds when ruminating upon some other question for which
common sense might deem the item of evidence relevant. There
are many places where the Rules of Evidence ask juries to cut
distinctions finer than ordinary—or for that matter, perhaps even
extraordinary—minds are capable: for example, when evidence
of a testifying defendant’s prior convictions are ostensibly
admitted to shed light on her credibility, but not her general
character or her propensity to commit crime.37 In general, courts
operate as if limited admissibility does work, even in those cases
when reasonable minds might doubt that it actually can, though
occasionally the fiction of limited admissibility seems too
blatantly fictional to tolerate.38 But when it came to figuring out
how to treat basis evidence disclosed by an expert witness,
courts had both a doctrinal and practical need to find a way to
see the evidence as admitted only for a limited purpose, rather
37

See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 609.
See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) (finding that
an out-of-court confession by a co-defendant accomplice, implicating the
defendant, is barred by the Confrontation Clause unless the accomplice
testifies and is available for cross-examination at trial).
38
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than generally admitted for the truth of its contents.
Why so? First, the practical difficulty: the obvious danger
with permitting disclosure by experts of their basis evidence is
that attorneys may attempt to “funnel” otherwise inadmissible
evidence in through experts; to get before the jury materials that
otherwise would be excluded. While subjecting disclosure to
some kind of balancing test might reduce this danger, another
protection, albeit a small one, might be offered by refusing to
treat these disclosures as substantive evidence of the truth of
their contents. This would, for example, prevent an attorney
from relying on a fact disclosed by an expert but otherwise not
in evidence in her closing argument. Nor could such a disclosure
be considered to establish the legal sufficiency of the evidence
for any element of the crime charged. Although whether these
limitations offered any substantial protection against expert
funneling might be doubtful, at least at the margins they
encouraged parties to introduce what evidence they could
through other channels rather than simply having the expert
disclose it as part of her factual basis.
Moreover, prior to Crawford, this “not for the truth of its
contents” stratagem offered the added benefit of making the
Confrontation Clause issue easy. Doctrinally, if expert
disclosures of basis evidence were treated as substantive
evidence offered to prove the truth of their contents, then they
were, functionally, a form of hearsay that fit no articulated
exception. As a matter of statutory interpretation, clearly this
would have suggested a lack of artful drafting: if they were an
admissible form of hearsay, why was there no corresponding
hearsay exception?39 A more serious problem, however, would
be that given that there was no explicit hearsay exception, these
disclosures could not be seen to fit a firmly rooted hearsay
exception, and thus, in criminal cases when the disclosures were
39

Some have argued that there should be an explicit hearsay exception.
See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, Inadmissible Evidence as a Basis for Expert
Testimony: A Reply to Professor Carlson, supra note 24; Paul R. Rice, The
Allure of the Illogic: A Coherent Solution for Rule 703 Requires More than
Redefining “Facts or Data”, supra note 24 (suggesting possibility of a new
hearsay exception for expert basis materials).
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offered by experts testifying for the prosecution, the
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence of the time—requiring
“particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”—would have been
implicated.40 Making such a determination would have at a
minimum added a layer of complexity to the decision whether to
permit disclosure of the basis evidence, and in many cases, it
might not have been plausible to argue that there were
particularized guarantees of reliability, as opposed to more
structural indicators merely suggesting that the category of
evidence is typically reliable.
Recall that the very basis for permitting expert reliance on
inadmissible evidence under Rule 703 is the assumption that
qualified experts themselves can adequately determine whether
facts within their purview are worthy of reliance, whether or not
they conform to the precise dictates of the rules of evidence.41
Indeed, in many circumstances, it may be every bit as
reasonable to think that an expert’s basis evidence is as reliable
as evidence that fits, for example, the “excited utterance”
exception or evidence admitted under Rule 803(3) and the
Hillmon doctrine regarding someone’s future intent (both of
which courts have deemed “firmly rooted”).42 Recall further that
prior to Crawford, the protections of the Confrontation Clause
were not, to say the least, terribly robust.
Moreover, the jurisprudence that followed Ohio v. Roberts
was filled with jurisprudential moves that could only be
understood as legal fictions. For example, the Court declared
that all firmly rooted hearsay exceptions met the necessary
reliability standard ipse dixit; that any firmly rooted hearsay
exception was sufficiently reliable was, in essence, an

40

Occasionally courts did try to suggest that basic evidence disclosed by
experts fell into a firmly rooted hearsay exception—a rather incredible claim,
considering the nonexistence of any formal hearsay exception on the matter.
41
FED. R. EVID. 703.
42
See, e.g., Hayes v. York, 311 F.3d 321, 324 (4th Cir. 2002) (finding
North Carolina’s state of mind exception to be firmly rooted for
Confrontation Clause purposes, relying in part on the long history of the
Hillmon doctrine).
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irrebutable presumption, taken as true as a matter of law.43 The
courts were willing to see nearly all the main hearsay exceptions
(except for the residual exception44 and the Rule 804 exception
for statements against interest45) as firmly rooted—and even
when the specific contours of a hearsay exception were tinkered
with via judicial opinion or by revision to the Rule, courts still
found these recently modified versions of the exceptions to
remain firmly rooted!46 Considering this approach to the
Confrontation Clause in aggregate, for courts to be forced into a
detailed Confrontation Clause analysis in order to permit
disclosure by an expert would have seemed at odds with the
generally meager protections it appeared to offer criminal
defendants against hearsay. It would have meant that the
protection turned out to be especially robust in a place where the
arguments for it were, if not weakest, then certainly no stronger
than in many other settings.
If only there were some way to see disclosures by experts in
terms that would not implicate the Confrontation Clause, this
peculiar result could be avoided. The courts invented such a
method: if the disclosure of basis evidence by experts was not
hearsay at all, as a corollary, it was by definition outside of the
Confrontation Clause’s purview.
This commonly made argument went like this: when experts
tell the jury about the matters upon which they relied, they are
not disclosing this information in order for the jury to make a
decision about its truth. Rather, these disclosures happen for an
(allegedly) separate purpose: to help the jury evaluate the
credibility of an expert. The jury will better be able to determine
if the expert has adequate grounds for her conclusion, and
whether she warrants being believed, by hearing about the
43

As Ohio v. Roberts put it, it could be “inferred without more.”
Roberts, 448 U.S., at 66.
44
See generally Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817 (1990).
45
Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 133-34 (1999).
46
See, e.g., Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987)
(rejecting the idea that the court’s modification of how co-conspirator
statements could be established to the judge had any effect on whether the
exception was firmly rooted).
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expert’s sources—not only the categories of information upon
which she relied, but the substance. Therefore, when this
substance is disclosed, it is introduced for the ostensibly nonhearsay purpose of aiding the factfinder in her evaluation of the
expert testimony. Because the information is not being
introduced for the truth of its contents, it is not actually hearsay
at all, and any potential Confrontation Clause problem
disappears into thin air.
The problem with this argument is that notwithstanding its
frequent invocation by courts, it makes almost no sense. To be
sure, the jury might have better grounds for evaluating the
expert’s testimony if it hears about the data upon which the
expert relied for her conclusion. But part of a rational evaluation
of the expert will thus entail an evaluation of her sources—which
will inevitably involve a judgment about the likelihood that the
sources themselves are valid and worthy of reliance. In other
words, to decide how much to credit the expert’s sources, the
jury should, logically, first assess the odds that they are reliable.
And what is this but a judgment about the likely truth of their
contents? Using the information for the permissible purpose of
evaluating the expert thus necessarily requires a preliminary
determination about the information’s truth. The permitted
purpose is therefore neither separate nor separable from an
evaluation of the truth of the statement’s contents.
To say that evidence offered for the purpose of helping the
jury to assess the expert’s basis is not being introduced for the
truth of its contents rests on an inferential error. To make
rational use of this evidence, a factfinder must first assess the
likelihood that it is worth relying upon. Having done so, she
may then build upon this first inference in order to assess the
likely reliability of the expert’s conclusions. The second
inference is what is permitted by the allegedly non-hearsay
purpose for the evidence. But this second judgment relies upon
the first, and the first is inherently a judgment about the likely
truth of the underlying basis. The fact that this underlying
judgment about the truth is then subsequently used in making
another judgment does not mean that the evidence is being used
for a non-hearsay purpose.
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To see this point more clearly, consider an example from
outside the expert context. Suppose a witness took the stand and
testified, “John was extremely drunk the night of April 13th.”
Imagine that the foundation for this opinion was not that the
witness had seen John slurring his words or imbibing large
quantities of alcohol, but rather, that a friend, whom the witness
had seen that night had reported to him that earlier that evening,
John had consumed seven drinks in the span of two hours. This
friend’s statement, if relayed to the court by the witness, would
obviously be hearsay. The fact that it informed the witness’
judgment about John’s drunkenness would not somehow make it
non-hearsay, or suggest that it was being introduced for a
purpose other than the truth of its contents, assuming that the
purpose of the witness’ testimony was to assert the conclusion
that John was drunk.47 As a logical matter, the jury can only
believe the witness’ conclusion about John’s drunkenness if it
also credits what the witness’ friend told him. This is quite
clearly a judgment about the truth of the matter asserted. By
contrast, if the witness had behaved in a particular way toward
John that evening because he believed him to be drunk, and that
behavior by the witness was itself relevant to the case, then the
statement could be introduced for the non-hearsay purpose of the
effect on the listener—it would be introduced not to establish
that John was drunk, but rather to inform our understanding of
why the witness behaved as he did. The mere fact that the friend
had said this to the witness would then be relevant for
understanding the witness’s actions—whether or not the words
spoken by the friend were accurate or true. But there is no
parallel to this “effect on listener” argument that holds up in the
context of expert basis evidence. The basis evidence is not being
introduced to explain the expert’s actions, but rather to explain
her conclusions. And assessing the conclusions is a judgment
about reliability, a determination about truth.
When Confrontation Clause jurisprudence was rather
47

Of course, if this was the witness’ sole basis for his opinion of
drunkenness, the opposing party could also object for lack of personal
knowledge. In the expert context, there is no requirement under the federal
rules of personal knowledge of underlying facts.
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toothless, this claim that expert basis evidence was being
introduced for a purpose apart from the truth of its contents
could have been seen as fictional but harmless, just another
fiction of a piece with the rest of the striking fictions that
operated within the doctrine.48 Given how little hearsay was
thought to be problematic under Ohio v. Roberts, an approach
that resulted in treating expert disclosures on par with most
other forms of hearsay, was, at least arguably, a practical
compromise even if it strained logic and common sense.49
Under Crawford, however, a reliability determination is
neither a necessary nor even a permissible inquiry for
determining whether evidence meets the Confrontation Clause.
Therefore, whatever confidence a court might have about the
likely reliability of an expert’s basis evidence is, quite simply,
beside the point. Moreover, the stakes in making the
hearsay/non-hearsay determination have increased. Prior to
Crawford, if a court deemed an expert’s disclosure or basis
evidence to be hearsay, that would have triggered analysis under
both the hearsay rule and under the Confrontation Clause.
Frequently, the disclosed evidence would have met the
requirements of one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule—for
example, forensic science reports could be deemed business
records (so long as the court did not think that the fact that they
were produced by litigation did not prevent them from falling
within the exception's confines); statements made to the police
by excited onlookers to an accident, and later used by an
accident reconstructionist, might well be excited utterances;
statements made by family members to a psychiatrist might fall
into the exception for statements made for purposes of medical
diagnoses or treatment. These are, of course, just examples—the
point is that whenever the basis evidence fit into a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, admitting the evidence as permitted hearsay
posed no Confrontation Clause issue. Moreover, under the Rule
48

Certainly some scholars did not see it as harmless. See, for example,
the several articles by Ronald Carlson, supra note 24.
49
To be sure, some judges resisted treating expert disclosures in this
manner even before Crawford. See, e.g., the strongly worded dissent in
United States v. Corey, 207 F.3d 84, 105 (1st Cir. 2000).
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803 exceptions, whether or not the hearsay declarant would have
been available to testify was irrelevant.50
Often, then, permitting the evidence in under Rule 703 was
simply a useful shortcut for evidence that could have been
admitted in other ways. Indeed, the Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 703 explicitly explains Rule 703 in these terms:
Thus a physician in his own practice bases his
diagnoses on information from numerous sources and
of considerable variety, including statements by
patients and relatives, reports and opinions from
nurses, technicians and other doctors, hospital records
and X rays. Most of them are admissible in evidence,
but only with the expenditures of substantial time in
producing and examining various authenticating
witnesses. The physician makes life-and-death
decisions in reliance upon them. His validation,
expertly performed and subject to cross-examination,
ought to suffice for judicial purposes.51
Whenever evidence could have been introduced under a
firmly-rooted hearsay exception, admitting it instead under Rule
703 to explain the expert’s conclusions might have operated as a
shortcut that reduced the need for authentication, but it was
nothing more. (Much of the time, indeed, both courts and
attorneys may well have seen an expert’s disclosures as
explicitly or implicitly coming in under a delineated hearsay
exception, and reserved the argument that the evidence was not
being introduced for the truth of its contents for those
circumstances when either the evidence clearly required
additional authentication to meet an exception, or when no
exception applied.)
Even when the evidence did not fall into a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, under the earlier approach to the
50

The use of the exceptions delineated under FED. R. EVID. 803 does
not require any showing of unavailability, unlike those delineated under FED.
R. EVID. 804. As a matter of evidence law there is, therefore, no preference
for non-hearsay as opposed to hearsay with respect to materials permitted
under the 803 exceptions.
51
Advisory Committee’s Note, FED. R. EVID. 703.
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Confrontation Clause it could well still have been admissible.
The question would then have been whether it could legitimately
have been introduced under the residual exception, Rule 807, or
the equivalent state provision. Rule 807 requires evidence to
have “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” equivalent to
those in place for the delineated hearsay exceptions. It could
certainly be argued that the reasonable reliance by a qualified
expert—especially,
post-Daubert
v.
Merrell
Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,52 coupled with the court’s determination
of adequate reliability to warrant admissibility of the
conclusions—would meet Rule 807’s requirements. At least as a
technical matter, Rule 807’s requirement of “circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness” equivalent to those found in the
delineated hearsay exceptions might not be precisely the same as
the “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” required under
Roberts, but even if the contours of Confrontation Clause
analysis were slightly different than those surrounding the use of
the residual exception, the foundational questions motivating
both inquiries were the same: necessity and reliability were the
touchstones for both. Thus, meeting the one standard would
usually, as a practical matter, mean meeting the other as well.
Indeed, it was precisely the frequent conflation of the hearsay
standard with the Confrontation Clause standard, coupled with
an anxiety that a judicial determination of reliability was
substituting for the constitutional guarantee of confrontation, that
led commentators to argue—and the Court in Crawford to
agree—that Confrontation Clause jurisprudence needed an
overhaul.
52

509 U.S. 579 (1993). Daubert, the first of the Supreme Court’s
trilogy on expert evidence, made clear that courts have a gatekeeping
responsibility under the Federal Rules, in order to assure that expert evidence
proffered at trial is sufficiently valid and reliable. Id. at 589. Daubert
rejected the notion that the older Frye test, which focused on whether the
expert evidence was “generally accepted” in the relevant expert community
was incorporated into the Federal Rules, and instead, building upon a general
gloss of the words “scientific . . . knowledge,” suggested a number of
criteria (including “general acceptance” by which the courts could evaluate
expert evidence). Id. at 584-87.
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Thus, pre-Crawford, even if courts had abandoned the
abracadabra of pronouncing some disclosures by experts to be
admissible as non-hearsay, most basis evidence disclosed by
experts would have been able to be introduced in some way,
though the degree of necessary rigmarole and judicial scrutiny of
the reliability of the statements would surely have increased.
Permitting experts to disclose matters to the jury for the
ostensibly non-hearsay purpose of helping them to evaluate the
expert’s reasoning probably did not lead with great frequency to
the disclosure of matters that could not have been introduced
through some other logic as well. And even when it did, in a
judicial environment in which the theoretical foundation of the
Confrontation Clause was reliability (coupled to some extent
with necessity), admitting purportedly reliable basis evidence
was, as a conceptual matter, relatively unproblematic, whatever
the awkward doctrinal logic through which it came in.
Along comes Crawford. Because Crawford no longer uses
reliability as a touchstone, the implicit justification for an
approach that was never entirely coherent falls apart. Before
Crawford, when courts indulged in the fiction that expert
disclosures were introduced for a purpose distinct from the truth
of the matter asserted, they were admitting evidence that often
would have been admissible on some other grounds. Even if it
would not have been able to fit another exception, assuming that
the reliance by the expert was in fact reasonable, the evidence
probably had as much of a structural guarantee of reliability as
plenty of admissible hearsay.53 Given that reliability was the
53

Note that I am by no means suggesting that the materials relied upon
by experts are generally reliable. I mean to express no view on this point.
But I see no reason to believe that statements upon which qualified experts
reasonably rely are any less likely to be reliable, as a general matter, than,
say, excited utterances, or statements made for the purposes of medical
diagnosis. To be sure, within a system of party-appointed adversarial experts,
we may have good reason to be worried about whether expert reliance takes
place in good faith, and there are no doubt many occasions on which highly
compensated experts are prepared to rely on materials that are not, in fact,
worthy of reliance. Still, the justification for Rule 703 is quite explicitly the
likely reliability of the evidence, a justification structurally analogous to that
supporting many of the Rule 803 hearsay exceptions. The empirical
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animating concern of the doctrine, the “not for the truth of the
contents” argument was a fiction, yes, but a fiction consistent
with the underlying values animating how the Confrontation
Clause was understood.
Quite clearly, Crawford changes this analysis. When the
focus on reliability is replaced by an inquiry into whether a
statement is “testimonial,” the already doubtful justifications for
the “not for the truth of its contents” argument for admitting
experts’ basis evidence fall away entirely. The axes for analysis
have shifted from reliability and necessity to an altogether
different concern. Moreover, under Crawford, that some of this
hearsay disclosed by an expert might also fit into a delineated
and firmly rooted hearsay exception becomes irrelevant: no
longer does whether an exception is firmly rooted make any
difference to the constitutionality of hearsay introduced against a
criminal defendant. If a basis statement upon which an expert
relies is testimonial, its use is unconstitutional whether or not it
also fits within a hearsay exception, and whether or not it is
reliable. Given this, to pretend that expert basis statements are
introduced for a purpose other than the truth of their contents is
not simply splitting hairs too finely or engaging in an extreme
form of formalism. It is, rather, an effort to make an end run
around a constitutional prohibition by sleight of hand.
Unfortunately, even after Crawford, courts in a number of
jurisdictions are continuing to claim that expert’s basis evidence
is introduced for a purpose other than the truth of its contents,
in order to avoid confronting the potential Crawford problem
with such testimony. The very first court to face the issue of
expert basis evidence post-Crawford intimated that it could be
introduced for the ostensibly non-hearsay purpose of explaining
the expert’s testimony.54 A number of other courts have gone on
foundations of this assumption are open to question in both settings, but this
gets well beyond the scope of my argument here.
54
United States v. Stone, 222 F.R.D. 334 (E.D. Tenn. 2004). To be
fair, in this case, it is not clear whether the court meant to permit only
reliance (and disclosure at the opposing party’s discretion on crossexamination), or was permitting disclosure on direct testimony as well
(presumably subject to the balancing test of Rule 705). In Stone, a federal
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to claim explicitly that when an expert discloses the basis for her
opinions, no Crawford issue is raised, because she is merely
introducing it to help the jury evaluate the expert’s testimony.55
district court admitted the expert testimony of an IRS agent in a criminal tax
fraud case even though this testimony was based partly on statements made
by company employees to a criminal tax investigator. The district court found
that it was not clear from the record whether the defendant had an
opportunity at the time these statements were made to cross-examine the
declarants, nor was there evidence as to whether the declarants were
presently unavailable to testify. Nonetheless, the court found no Confrontation
Clause problem:
Even if the particular Benton Manufacturing employees are
not “unavailable” and even if the statements they gave to
IRS criminal investigator Bohannan during the interviews
Ms. Cantrel attended are “testimonial” as contemplated by
the Court in Crawford, the statements may nevertheless be
used by Ms. Cantrel in forming her expert opinions because
they would not be used to establish the truth of the matters
the employees asserted. Rather, if defense counsel were to
elicit the statements from Ms. Cantrel on cross-examination,
the purpose of the out-of-court statements would not be for
hearsay purposes but rather would be for evaluating the
merit of the opinions Ms. Cantrel offered on direct
examination. Because Crawford explicitly maintained the
Confrontation Clause’s inapplicability to statements used at
trial for purposes other than establishing the truth of the
matter asserted, Ms. Cantrel could rely on the employees’
statements in forming her opinions.
On the one hand, Stone refers to eliciting the information on crossexamination: if this is truly all the court means to permit, there is nothing
problematic about this. Clearly the defense can if it chooses inquire into the
basis for the prosecution’s experts’ conclusions on cross-examination. On the
other hand, the logic of the court’s reasoning—that disclosing the statements
could be for the purpose of assessing the merits of the opinions, and this is a
purpose separate from the truth of the statements’ contents—would seem to
apply equally to disclosure on direct examination, and hence, would intimate
that such disclosure was not prohibited by Crawford. Moreover, the court
seems to conflate expert use and expert disclosure. Though there may be an
argument that Crawford should prevent not simply disclosure but expert
reliance on testimonial evidence, this is surely a relatively separate question
from, and a far closer question than, that of expert disclosure of testimonial
evidence under the guise of claiming that it is not for the truth of its contents.
55
See, e.g., People v. Thomas, 130 Cal. App. 4th 1202 (2005); State v,
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In some of these cases, the “not for the truth of its contents”
argument borders on the truly preposterous. Take for example, a
series of cases in North Carolina about the admissibility of
forensic science reports conducted by one expert, but introduced
into evidence by someone other than the person who ran the
tests and wrote the report. One such case was State v. Jones, in
which a forensic chemist testified in court that a substance found
in the defendant’s possession was cocaine. The basis for her
conclusion was a laboratory analysis conducted by another agent
who did not testify. The testifying witness detailed the testing
methodology used by the nontestifying expert and explained that
she reasonably relied on this test in concluding that the
substance was cocaine. The laboratory report conducted by the
other agent was also admitted by the trial court into evidence.
Over the defendant’s objection that this violated the
Confrontation Clause, the state appellate court in an unpublished
opinion insisted that Crawford did not apply because the
laboratory analysis was only “admitted to demonstrate the basis
of the expert opinion . . . [and] not admitted for the purpose of
proving the truth of the matter asserted.”56
This is surely nonsense. The expert’s in-court testimony was,
in essence, “this laboratory report written by someone else,
which reports on the tests that were conducted, reliably informs
me that the substance is cocaine, and therefore I can reliably
inform you that it is cocaine.” In fact, the report and the
accompanying notes were the testifying witness’ only basis for
judging the substance to be cocaine. The expert’s judgment that
the substance was cocaine could be accurate if and only if the
report by the other nontestifying agent determining the substance
to be cocaine was itself accurate. It cannot be seriously doubted
that the report was coming in both to demonstrate the basis of
the expert opinion and for the truth of its contents—if it were
Jones, 603 S.E.2d 168, 2004 WL 1964890 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004)
(unpublished opinion). State v. Delaney, 613 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005); State v. Lyles, 615 S.E.2d 890 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); State v. Bunn,
619 S.E.2d 918 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
56
State v, Jones, 603 S.E.2d 168, 2004 WL 1964890 (N.C. Ct. App.
2004) (unpublished opinion).

MNOOKIN.DOC

7/11/2007 7:25 PM

EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CONFRONTATION

825

not true, the expert in fact had no basis at all for her conclusion.
The expert was not even aggregating multiple disparate sources
of evidence, or making novel inferences from the basis
evidence—instead, he was basically parroting the conclusions
reached in the report itself. One can sympathize with a court’s
desire to permit the disclosure of basis evidence that is probably
reliable, such as a routine analysis of drug composition. But to
pretend that it is not being introduced for the truth of its
contents simply strains all credibility.
New York’s highest court has been the first court explicitly
to reject the “not for the truth of its contents” argument with
respect to expert basis evidence post-Crawford. In People v.
Goldstein,57 the Court stated:
The claim that the [statements made to Hegarty, the
expert] were not hearsay is based on the theory that
they were not offered to prove the truth of what the
interviewees said. . . . Here, according to the People,
the interviewees’ statements were not evidence in
themselves, but were admitted only to help the jury in
evaluating Hegarty’s opinion, and thus were not
offered to establish their truth. We find the distinction
the People make unconvincing. We do not see how
the jury could use the statements of the interviewees
to evaluate Hegarty’s opinion without accepting as a
premise either that the statements were true or that
they were false. Since the prosecution’s goal was to
buttress Hegarty’s opinion, the prosecution obviously
wanted and expected the jury to take the statements as
true. Hegarty herself said her purpose in obtaining
the statements was “to get to the truth.” The
distinction between a statement offered for its truth
and a statement offered to shed light on an expert’s
opinion is not meaningful in this context.58
In a relatively unusual move, the Goldstein court considered
this issue sua sponte. But its answer was spot on: courts should
57
58

6 N.Y.3d 119 (2005).
Id. at 127-28.
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not be able to avoid analysis of the Crawford issues present
when prosecution experts disclose the substance of their sources
on direct examination, through the fictional claim that such
statements are offered for a purpose other than their truth.
I have addressed this argument in particular detail because it
reflects such a dramatic temptation for courts facing the issue of
expert basis evidence post-Crawford. While it would not, of
course, provide a way around Crawford for certificates of
analysis, it would essentially eliminate all expert basis issues
from Crawford’s purview. If expert basis evidence is disclosed
for a non-hearsay purpose, then any potential Crawford problem
with its disclosure entirely disappears. And because this way of
framing expert disclosure has been a longstanding legal fiction,
it beckons seductively as a potential solution to these Crawford
issues. But it is simply not possible for a jury to make use of an
expert report that is disclosed as a source by another expert, or
even of statements upon which the expert has relied, without
first judging their likely accuracy. Unless a court can actually
detail a chain of inferences that makes the disclosure useful for a
genuinely non-hearsay purpose (i.e., a purpose that does not
require a preliminary assessment of the likely accuracy of the
source) then the seductive charms of this poorly reasoned
argument should be resisted.
In some post-Crawford cases, courts have made a subtler and
more plausible argument—that Crawford does not prohibit
experts from referring in fairly general terms to the kinds of
sources on which they relied.59 When only the general nature of
59

See, e.g., In re Julio D., No. G033550, 2004 Cal. App. LEXIS
10962, 2004 WL 2786375 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2004) (unpublished opinion
reasoning that when information was “presented in generalized form as the
basis for the experts’ opinions, Crawford was not violated”); People v. Ortiz,
No. D042552, 2005 Cal App. LEXIS 3255, 2005 WL 851716, at *8 (Cal.
Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2005) (unpublished opinion finding that an expert’s
mention of and reliance on field investigation reports and other hearsay
matters did not violate Crawford “because an expert is subject to crossexamination about his or her opinions and additionally, the materials on
which the expert bases an opinion are not elicited for the truth of their
contents; they are examined to assess the weight of the expert’s opinion.” It
is unclear from the opinion whether these field reports were simply
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the sources is described, the argument that the information is
introduced strictly to help the factfinder assess the expert’s
testimony is stronger, especially when the expert has relied on
an array of different kinds of sources, only some of which are
even arguably testimonial. This argument, however, cannot
justify a detailed recital of the substance of the testimonial
evidence on which the expert has relied.60
To be sure, some litigants might argue that if describing the
general kinds of evidence is permissible for a non-hearsay
purpose, then describing their contents ought also to be, for
whatever use the former might have for helping the jury
understand the expert is equivalently provided by the latter as
well. In other words, if telling the jury that an expert’s opinion
was based on five particular sources without detailing their
actual contents might help the jury assess whether these sources
are of a kind likely to provide useful information for the expert’s
conclusions, the jury could use a substantive description of the
five sources for this same purpose, without actually relying on a
judgment about the truth of the contents. But this argument
should fail. It is, in fact, structurally analogous to the argument
mentioned or whether their contents were described in detail; only the former
could be justified as a non-hearsay use.).
60
When the expert opinion consists of nothing beyond agreement with
the conclusions of another expert’s report, this distinction between the nature
of the expert’s sources and their content dissolves. If, in State v. Jones, No.
COA03-976, 2004 WL 1964890 (N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2004) (unpublished
opinion), for example, the court had permitted the expert to testify that the
substance was cocaine and the basis of the expert’s conclusion was a careful
examination of another expert’s toxicological report, that would, in essence,
be disclosing the contents of this other report even if the report itself were
not admitted. See also State v. Delaney, 613 S.E.2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App.
2005) (permitting one expert to testify that he reviewed the methodology used
by another in testing drugs, and relied on the colleague’s analysis to reach his
judgment that the substances in question were marijuana and opium). In cases
like these, distinguishing between category and content may be a distinction
without a difference. However, in those many cases when an expert’s
judgment derives from multiple testimonial inputs, permitting the expert to
delineate the categories without disclosing the contents may be a sensible
method for respecting Confrontation Clause values while simultaneously
permitting expert reliance on inadmissible materials when reasonable.
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the government attempted to make in Old Chief v. United
States61: that because the government had a need to prove that
the defendant had committed a prior felony as an element of a
“felon in possession” charge in the present case, it ought also to
be able to prove the name of the felony in question
notwithstanding the defendant’s offer to stipulate the existence of
his previous conviction.
The Court in Old Chief appropriately rejected this argument,
essentially acknowledging that while parties ought to have
substantial leeway to prove their cases in the way they chose, at
the same time, courts had to consider the existence of
“evidentiary substitutes,” alternative ways to prove the same
matter with equivalent probative value and less prejudicial
impact.62 Just as in that case an offer to stipulate provided the
equivalent probative value of naming the particular disclosed
crime, while greatly lessening the danger of an unfairly
prejudicial character inference, here too, describing the
categories of evidence without detailing the contents reduces the
chances that the jury will make substantive inferences about the
truth of their contents, inferences which are impermissible under
Crawford whenever the basis evidence is testimonial.
In Old Chief, the Court recognized that the name of the prior
felony committed by the defendant was relevant under Rule 401,
because the felony, if introduced by name, would help prove
that he violated the felon-in-possession law.63 But a stipulation
61

Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172 (1997).
Id. As the Court put it:
On objection, the court would decide whether a particular item
of evidence raised a danger of unfair prejudice. If it did, the
judge would go on to evaluate the degrees of probative value
and unfair prejudice not only for the item in question but for any
actually available substitutes as well. If an alternative were
found to have substantially the same or greater probative value
but a lower danger of unfair prejudice, sound judicial discretion
would discount the value of the item first offered and exclude it
if its discounted probative value were substantially outweighed
by unfairly prejudicial risk.
Id. at 182-83.
63
Id.
62
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or admission that the defendant had indeed previously been
convicted of a felony that would count under the felon-inpossession law, without providing the actual name of the prior
felony, would have virtually the same probative value. This
alternative form of proof had a side benefit: substantially
reducing the danger that the jury would impermissibly think that
because the defendant had committed an assault before, he was
more likely to have committed this assault with which he was
now charged—an impermissible character inference under our
evidentiary rules.64 For permissible inferences, this evidentiary
substitute was just as good, and it avoided providing information
to the jury that it would be quite likely to misuse.
A virtually identical argument applies with respect to expert
basis evidence under Crawford. Even assuming that experts may
legitimately disclose to the jury the kinds of information on
which they have relied, this ought not to mean that they may
disclose the substance of this basis when it is testimonial. To be
sure, disclosing the substance of the expert’s basis evidence does
also reveal the category, and hence, is strictly speaking relevant
for the purpose of helping the expert to evaluate the legitimacy
of the kinds of evidence made use of by the expert, just as the
name of the felony was appropriately recognized by Souter as
relevant in Old Chief. But just as prohibiting disclosure of the
name of the felony in Old Chief protected the jury from
impermissible inferences, disclosing only the category of
testimonial expert basis evidence protects the jury from the
danger that they will impermissibly attempt to assess the truth of
the testimonial basis evidence without a chance to cross examine
the actual declarant.
1. Business Records as an Exception to Crawford
Many Courts have attempted to avoid Crawford’s strictures
with respect to both forensic science reports and certificates of
analysis by making recourse to a supposed business records
64

Id. For the rules governing character evidence, see generally Federal
Rules of Evidence 404-405.
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exception to the Confrontation Clause’s dictates.65 To be sure,
Crawford does state that some hearsay is not testimonial. It
notes that “[m]ost of the hearsay exceptions [recognized in
1791] covered statements that by their nature were not
testimonial—for example, business records or statements in
furtherance of a conspiracy.”66 Certainly, a bill, a receipt, a
demand letter, or other commercial writings not prepared with
an eye toward criminal litigation would not be “testimonial”
within the meaning of Crawford. But it is extravagant to read
65

See, e.g., Perkins, 897 So. 2d at 462–465 (finding that autopsy report
fits into a business-record exception to Crawford ); Commonwealth v. Verde,
827 N.E.2d 701, 703 (Mass. 2005) (calling drug certificate “akin to a
business record”); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 2005)
(exempting autopsy report from Crawford under business-record exception);
State v. Thackaberry, 95 P.3d 1142, 1145 (Or. Ct. App. 2004) (reasoning
that because a laboratory report “may be analogous to, or arguably even the
same as, a business or official record,” it might not be testimonial under
Crawford, and hence it was not plain error for the trial court to admit a
toxicology report in the absence of an objection); Rollins v. State, 866 A.
926 (Md. Ct. App. 2005) (autopsy report nontestimonial under business
records exception so long as the findings reported are “routine, descriptive
and not analytical,” but not if they report “contested conclusions”); United
States v. Bahena-Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2005) (warrant of
deportation nontestimonial because it was like other routine, objective public
records, such as birth certificates) People v. Meras, No. F044043, 2005 WL
1562735 (Cal. Ct. App. July 5, 2005) (unpublished opinion noting that DNA
laboratory results are business records and hence not testimonial under
Crawford); People v. Fajardo, No. F045640, 2005 WL 1683615 (Cal. Ct.
App. July 18, 2005) (unpublished opinion); State v. Cutro, 618 S.E. 2d 890
(S.C. 2005) (considering autopsy reports public records and hence nontestimonial); State v. Windley, 617 S.E. 2d 682 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005);
Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S. 2d 772 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (declaring
foundational breath test certificates business records that do not implicate the
core concerns of the Confrontation Clause despite an “incidental” litigation
purpose); State v. Kronich, 128 P. 3d 119 (Wash Ct. App. 2006) (finding a
department of licensing record asserting that defendant’s license was revoked
nontestimonial as a business and/or public record); State v. Forte, 360 N.C.
427, 435 (N.C. 2006) (asserting that business records, including forensic
science laboratory reports, are nontestimonial because they “are neutral, are
created to serve a number of purposes important to the creating organization,
and are not inherently subject to manipulation or abuse.”)
66
Crawford, 541 U.S, at 61.
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this dictum as creating a generalized business-records exception
to the application of Crawford. The fact that most business and
public records are not testimonial does not exempt those that are
from Crawford’s dictates. There is simply no logical basis for a
per se business records exception to the reach of the
Confrontation Clause. (Note, though, that Chief Justice
Rehnquist, in his concurrence, elevates the dictum of the
majority opinion into a genuine exception, writing, “To its
credit, the Court’s analysis of ‘testimony’ excludes at least some
hearsay exceptions, such as business records and official
records.”67 But Rehnquist’s say-so does not make it so, and
Rehnquist’s concurrence in the judgment is largely an argument
against the majority’s approach, as he objects both to the
substitution of the testimonial for the earlier inquiry into
reliability, and the decision to create an “immutable category of
excluded evidence.”68)
Recall that the core idea of Crawford is that when the state
procures evidence expected to be used as substantive evidence
incriminating a criminal defendant, that evidence is testimonial.
Forensic science laboratory reports are surely testimonial in this
sense, and so are certificates of analysis. With the latter, in fact,
their very raison d’etre is to be a substitute for testimony; they
are overtly designed as a shortcut, a way to prove something
without having to introduce live testimony. Both certificates of
analysis and forensic test reports in general are made with an
explicit eye toward eventual prosecution. Their purpose is to
provide information that will be useful both to identify the
perpetrator of a criminal act (through, for example, DNA
identification, fingerprinting, or ballistics evidence), or to
identify the criminality of an act (by, for example, analyzing
drugs, or blood alcohol levels, or the cause of death of a
victim), but in addition and concomitant with their investigatory
purposes, these tests are surely conducted in significant part
precisely in order to provide legal evidence in court.
Forensic scientists and those requesting their services know
67
68

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id. at 74.
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full well that the information may be used as testimony, and this
is true regardless of whether the test is performed by
government employees or an independent laboratory. As one of
the few courts that has correctly deemed these tests testimonial
wrote, “[b]ecause the test was initiated by the prosecution and
generated by the desire to discover evidence against defendant,
the results were testimonial.”69
If courts continue to permit certificates of analysis and
forensic evidence reports without requiring the testimony of their
creator through a supposed business records exception, they will
be eroding whatever claims to increased coherence Crawford
appeared to offer. It is true that most business records are not
produced in settings in which their future use as evidence is a
primary purpose, and accordingly, most business records are
therefore not testimonial. But records created by law
enforcement personnel or those hired to provide support to law
enforcement processes—a group that would surely include both
state forensic scientists and those at private laboratories hired to
perform forensic tests for the prosecution—ought to fall into the
category of the “testimonial,” even if they are also appropriately
understood to be business records for the purpose of the relevant
hearsay exception.
2. Cross-Examination of the Expert as an Adequate Substitute
for Cross-Examination of the Declarant
Prior to Crawford, courts sometimes concluded that the
opportunity to cross-examine the expert, rather than the hearsay
declarant, satisfied Confrontation Clause concerns even when
the basis evidence was disclosed by the expert on direct
examination. After Crawford, this view is untenable; if the basis
69

People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S. 2d 393, 397 (App. Div. 2004); see
also State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (rejecting the
argument that all business records are exempt from Crawford); Belvin v.
State, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (rejecting the state’s
argument that a breath test affidavit memorializing a nontestifying breath test
technician’s procedures and observations in administering the test were
nontestimonial hearsay).
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for the expert’s testimony is “testimonial,” then substituted
cross-examination cannot be constitutionally adequate. Several
courts have nonetheless continued to suggest that expert
disclosure of basis information does not raise Confrontation
Clause concerns because the expert, though not the declarant, is
available for cross-examination.70
The idea that cross-examining the expert is an adequate
substitute for confronting the expert’s sources directly is one of
the rationales underlying Rule 703’s willingness to permit
experts to rely on inadmissible information. This justification
exists alongside a necessity justification, based upon the
recognition that experts invariably rely in part on hearsay, in the
books they have read, the courses they have studied, the
experiences from which they have learned. One might therefore
worry that if cross-examining the expert were not understood to
be a substitute for cross-examining the underlying basis evidence
itself, it could lead to a kind of infinite regress, a need to call
witness after witness in order to get to the root of whatever it
was that the expert relied upon. This fear, however, is
unwarranted: even applying Crawford strictly, there is no grave
danger that in order to satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns,
the prosecutor would need to call a stream of additional
70

See, e.g., State v. Jones, 603 S.E.2d 168, 2004 WL 1964890 (N.C.
Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2004) (unpublished opinion quoting with approval a preCrawford state case emphasizing that the opportunity to cross-examine the
expert satisfies the Sixth Amendment); State v. Leonard, No. 2004-1609,
2005 WL 1039635 (La. Ct. App., Apr. 27, 2005) (defendant’s Confrontation
Clause right was satisfied because he had an opportunity to cross-examine the
prosecution’s expert, even though the testifying expert was not the one who
had conducted the autopsy and written the autopsy report); State v. Delaney,
613 S.E. 2d 699 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (finding no Crawford problem in part
because the testifying expert was available for cross-examination about his
reliance on the tests and reports performed by others); People v. Thomas,
130 Cal. App. 4th 1202 (2005) (noting “the expert is subject to crossexamination about his or her opinions”); State v. Durham, 625 S.E.2d 831,
833 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (finding no violation of the confrontation right
when the expert is available for cross-examination, notwithstanding the
testifying expert’s reliance upon and disclosures regarding an autopsy
conducted by others.).

MNOOKIN.DOC

7/11/2007 7:25 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

834

witnesses to justify every matter upon which an expert has
relied. Crawford, after all, applies only to testimonial evidence.
Most general expertise gained through study, reading, and
experience will not, in fact be testimonial, and even a good deal
of case-specific information will frequently not be testimonial
either. Hence, all of these matters can be relied upon by the
expert and—subject to the application of Rule 705 or the state
equivalent—even disclosed without triggering problems under
Crawford.
However, in those instances when an expert’s basis evidence
is testimonial, cross-examining the expert cannot be deemed a
constitutionally adequate substitute under Crawford for being
able to confront whoever actually issued the testimonial
statements. It is not that cross-examination of the expert about
the basis will necessarily lack utility. Questioning the expert
about the reasons for her reliance on the statements and the
reasonableness of this reliance might well give a factfinder
useful information for evaluating the likely reliability of both the
expert and the underlying basis. But Crawford is quite clear:
“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously
reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant
is obviously guilty.”71 Cross-examining the expert cannot
therefore satisfy Crawford’s requirements with respect to the
testimonial basis evidence, any more than cross-examining a
detective who took an affidavit can substitute for crossexamining the declarant. Crawford’s language simply does not
permit cross-examination of a surrogate when the evidence in
question is testimonial.
To see why this is so, imagine the same issue outside of the
expert context: it is abundantly clear that under Crawford the
policeman who interrogates a witness cannot testify about the
substance of the witness’ statement in lieu of having the witness
herself take the stand. If such substituted cross-examination were
generally permitted, it would erode Crawford’s very
foundations, for it would provide a way around confrontation of
the witness herself in nearly all cases involving formalized
71

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62.
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testimonial materials. Moreover, at least in the non-expert
context, the substitute witness might be someone personally
present when the affidavit or statement was made, and therefore
someone with personal knowledge about its circumstances and
context. By contrast, when one expert testifies on a report made
by someone else, most of the time they were not even present
when the tests reported on were conducted and memorialized!
As I shall suggest in Part III, there may nonetheless be some
reason to distinguish substituted cross-examination of an expert
about a report from the substituted cross-examination of nonexpert witnesses, though the opinions permitting substituted
cross-examination do not yet, for the most part, develop this
point with any care. Perhaps over time, the Supreme Court will
be willing to find that in some limited circumstances, the crossexamination of an expert may substitute for the crossexamination of his sources, even when the source’s statements
do fit within the category of testimonial evidence. However, it is
difficult to see how such an expansion could be wrought without
a nod toward the same values that underpin Rule 703: reliability
and necessity, both of which are rejected as justifications under
Crawford. In any event, Crawford as written offers no plausible
justification for this position; in Part III, I will begin to explore
whether there are rational grounds for treating substituted crossexamination differently in the context of expert testimony.
3. Crawford’s Impracticality
Some courts have tried to justify their decisions that forensic
science reports, other expert basis testimony, or certificates of
analysis are not testimonial, even though they were produced
explicitly for future use in the courtroom, by asserting that no
matter what Crawford might seem to dictate, any other
conclusion is simply too impracticable.72 Hauling every forensic
72

See, e.g., People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 2005)
(detailing impracticality of treating autopsy reports as testimonial hearsay,
especially because they are non-replicable and so much time may pass
between test and testimony that the medical examiner is unlikely to have
independent recollection apart from the report itself); State v. Cunningham,
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expert who writes a report into court to testify simply cannot be
constitutionally required, they suggest, especially because
routine forensic tests are likely in most circumstances to be
reliable
The quandary over these issues is understandable. It may be
a significant drain on limited forensic science budgets to require
that every forensic test be presented in court by whoever
actually performed the test, unless that examiner is unavailable
and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.
In some cases, strictly complying with Crawford might be not
just inconvenient but impossible. Many years can pass between
the preparation of an autopsy report in a homicide case and the
apprehension and trial of the perpetrator.73 By this point, the
medical examiner who prepared the report might have moved
out of state, changed professions, or even died. How can such a
person testify or even provide an opportunity for crossexamination? Certainly, as the Kansas Supreme Court pointed
out, excluding an autopsy report in a case in which the
pathologist who conducted the test years earlier is now
unavailable or deceased is indeed a “harsh” result, considering
that autopsies are conducted “in an environment where the
medical examiner would have little incentive to fabricate the
results.”74
903 So. 2d 1110 (La. 2005) (noting that twenty marijuana cases might be
processed during each session of night court in Orleans Parish, and asserting
that making defendants take a small procedural step (e.g., subpoenaing the
testing expert) is reasonable because these matters “often are not in dispute”).
73
See Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
74
State v. Lackey, 120 P. 3d 332, 351 (Kan. 2005). As another court
put it, “[a]t oral argument, in this Court, defense counsel was given a
hypothetical about a situation in which the maker of an autopsy report dies
before the date of trial. Defense counsel stated that, even in that situation, the
maker of the autopsy report would still be required to meet Crawford
standards, and in the maker’s absence, the State would be required to prove
the victim’s death in another manner. This is unacceptable in practical
application.” Rollins v. State, 897 A.2d 821 (Md. 2006). Note that it may
not be quite so clear as the Lackey court would have it that medical
examiners have little incentive to fabricate. While the vast majority of
forensic professionals no doubt perform their jobs with care and integrity, the
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Following Crawford strictly can seem especially nonsensical
when there is little chance that the actual declarant, the author of
the forensic report, will still have any independent memory of
conducting the test by the time of trial, either because many
years have passed or because the volume of similar tests makes
it unlikely that the expert will retain a specific memory of the
one in question. In this case, any expert who testifies about the
report will most likely be relying wholly on what has been
memorialized within the report itself. When this recognition
combines with the widespread and often (though by no means
always) warranted belief that forensic science tests are likely to
be conducted in a reliable manner, excluding the autopsy, blood
analysis, or whatever test is at issue because the declarant is
unavailable may seem like constitutional overkill.
The inefficiency of requiring live testimony from the actual
person who conducted the test may point to a cogent critique of
Crawford’s formalism. However, Crawford is quite explicit on
this point:
Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.
To be sure, the Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure
reliability of evidence, but it is a procedural rather
than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in
a particular manner: by testing in the crucible of
cross-examination.75
Moreover, within the judicial hierarchy, it is not for trial
courts to reject the Supreme Court’s test simply because of its
impracticable, or even harsh, consequences.
Even taking Crawford’s dictates seriously, the fact that
experts can rely on inadmissible evidence without disclosing it
would often permit a surrogate expert to express a conclusion to

close connections between forensic scientists and the prosecution can create
structural incentives for the forensic scientists to produce results that please
the prosecution—and in some cases this has indeed even meant fabrication.
75
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.

MNOOKIN.DOC

7/11/2007 7:25 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

838

the jury based on the inadmissible report.76 Although the jury
would not be able to see or hear about the details of the report
itself, Crawford does not prohibit some expert other than the
declarant from considering the report in the course of her expert
evaluation. Perhaps over time Courts will find a way to hone
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence to permit disclosure in
certain circumstances, especially when the report’s author is
genuinely unavailable, but for the moment, refusing to apply
Crawford simply because of its impractical consequences should
not be a legitimate option for the lower courts.77
4. Disclosure of Objective or Factual Results
Several courts have attempted to distinguish matters of
opinion and judgment from factual, unambiguous, and objective
reports. In State v. Lackey,78 for example, the Kansas Supreme
Court distinguished between “factual, routine, descriptive and
nonanalytical findings,” which it deemed non-testimonial, and
“contested opinions, speculations and conclusions derived from
these objective findings,” which the court viewed as
76

For examples of this argument, see Louisiana v. Garner, 913 So. 2d
874 (La Ct. App. 2005) (emphasizing that testifying witness was rendering
his own opinion and judgment, not merely repeating the autopsy report
prepared by another); State v. Barton, 700 N.W. 2d 93, 97 (Wisc. Ct. App.
2005) (holding that confrontation right is satisfied “if a qualified expert
testifies as to his or her independent opinion, even if the opinion is based in
part on the work of another.”). In Barton, however, while the trial court did
not admit the report itself, it did permit the witness to testify about the test
performed by the non-testifying expert, the procedures used and the results
achieved. This degree of detail cannot be justified under Crawford.
77
See, e.g., People v. Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d 512, 517 (Just. Ct. 2005)
(recognizing the practical concerns but pointing out that “the current Court’s
formalistic approach to interpreting the guarantees of the Sixth Amendment
provides little room for accommodation of the pragmatic issues its decisions
might raise in the day-to-day administration of criminal justice.”). However,
this opinion was attacked collaterally in Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d
772 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding that although not all business records can be
admitted as nontestimonial under Crawford, a statutorily mandated
maintenance certificate for a breath testing machine can be).
78
120 P. 3d 332 (Kan. 2005).
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testimonial.79 These courts are, in essence, narrowing the
applicability of the business records exception to the hearsay
rule as an escape valve under Crawford. Instead of finding that
business records are per se exempt from the testimonial, they
are taking a closer look at the nature of the record. These courts
believe facts and objective findings by experts are admissible
even without an opportunity for confrontation, whereas opinions
and inferences should be redacted from a report and excluded
unless Crawford’s dictates are met.
The core idea underlying these opinions is that the more a
laboratory finding looks like a factual observation, “an objective
finding which would have been observed and recorded by any
trained individual in that field,” the less useful crossexamination is likely to be.80 The underlying logic asks: when
there is not room for judgment, interpretation, or difference in
opinion, what precisely would be gained by pressing the
recorder on the stand about the matter recorded? In addition,
there is obviously a strong reliability undercurrent underpinning
these opinions, a belief that the more straightforward and
unambiguous the matter recorded, the more confident we can be
that the methods and processes used to make the record can help
to assure its reliability.81
79

Id. at 351; see also United States v. Bahena Cardenas, 411 F.3d 1067,
1075 (9th Cir. 2005) (warrant of deportation not testimonial because it was
“routine, objective, cataloging of an unambiguous factual matter”); Rollins v.
State, 866 A.2d 926, 948 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2005), aff’d, 897 A.2d 821
(finding no Confrontation Clause concern for statements of fact conditions
objectively ascertained); North Carolina v. Huu the Cao, 626, S.E.2d. 301,
305 (N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that laboratory reports are nontestimonial
business records “only when the testing is mechanical. . . and the information
contained in the documents are objective facts not involving opinions or
conclusions drawn by the analyst.”); State v. Melton, 625 S.E.2d 609, 612
(N.C. Ct. App. 2006) (forensic science reports are nontestimonial business
records if they report “objective fact obtained through a mechanical means”).
80
People v. Mellott, No. 1173-05, 2005 WL 3322843 (N.Y. Just. Ct.,
2005).
81
This is on occasion explicit. See, e.g., Rollins, 897 A.2d 821; People
v. Fajardo, No. F045640, 2005 WL 1683615 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul 18, 2005)
(unreported opinion finding demeanor evidence would not be helpful to assess
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However, there is less to these arguments than meets the
eye. First, the reliability justification, while perhaps intuitively
appealing, is explicitly taken off the table in Crawford itself.
Crawford’s critique of Ohio v. Roberts is precisely that it
permitted “a jury to hear evidence, untested by the adversary
process, based on a mere judicial determination of reliability,”
and Crawford explicitly rejected such “surrogate means” for
assessing reliability.82 Moreover, having a judge make a
determination about whether the matter is fact or opinion,
unambiguous or subject to interpretation, analytical or
nonanalytical is, in essence, delegating to the judge the power to
decide whether cross-examination and confrontation are
warranted in a particular instance. This seems as unjustifiable
under Crawford’s approach as a direct judicial determination of
reliability. In addition, the premise is itself controversial: the
idea that descriptive and non-analytical findings are not
themselves open to differences in judgment or interpretation is
itself a matter upon which people’s reasonable judgments may
differ. And certainly, given the disclosure of a number of
scandals in which “factual” reports of forensic science
laboratories or medical examiners turned out to have been faked
or otherwise misreported,83 it is not plausible to say that in no
circumstance could confrontation and cross-examination be
helpful with respect to seemingly unambiguous factual findings
contained in laboratory reports.
Furthermore, the logic, if taken seriously, would extend well
beyond the forensic science setting. The claim of a bystander,
made to a policeman interrogating witnesses after a bank
robbery has concluded, that he saw three men wearing grey
report’s credibility).
82
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
83
See, e.g., Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist’s Plea Adds to Turmoil:
Discovery of Possibly Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense
Challenges, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1993, at 24; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of the
Inspector General, The FBI DNA Laboratory: A Review of Protocol and
Practice Vulnerability (2004), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/special/
0405/final.pdf; Jim Yardley, Doubts on Evidence Put Oklahoma City Police
Scientist Under Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2001.
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overcoats and masks enter the bank at 10:30 a.m. is every bit as
factual and non-analytic as a forensic report. And yet just about
any judge would recognize that such statements surely fall
squarely into the category of the testimonial under Crawford.
Attempting to graft an inquiry into whether the matter at issue is
factual or interpretive onto Crawford’s focus on the testimonial
would either lead to enormous inconsistencies across categories,
exclude large amounts of testimonial evidence from the purview
of the Confrontation Clause, or both.
*
*
*
In this Section, I have described a variety of judicial efforts
to continue to permit both certificates of analysis and the
disclosure of expert reports and other basis evidence even when
the declarant is not available on the stand. None of these
arguments, however, is persuasive. Some of them—such as
arguing that basis evidence is not hearsay because it is not being
introduced for the truth of its contents, or suggesting that there
is a per se business records exception, or that Crawford should
treat factual claims different from opinions—are intellectually
incoherent. The claim that Crawford is impractical may be
accurate, but it is not actually an argument—it is better, perhaps,
considered as a plea for reconsidering Crawford’s scope, or as a
call for the development of arguments that could mitigate its
consequence. Perhaps an argument can be made to distinguish
substituted cross-examination in the expert context, but it is
simply untenable that Crawford could mean that substituted
cross-examination is, as a general matter, a legitimate alternative
for cross-examining the hearsay declarant: this would permit any
testimonial statement into court so long as someone present
when the earlier statement was made is on the stand to answer
questions about it!
One of the key purposes of this Article is to invite the lower
courts to rethink their willingness to rely on these arguments.
There are already sufficiently large numbers of cases relying
upon precisely these arguments that some courts are,
unfortunately, beginning not even to argue these points with
care, instead merely relying on the allegedly persuasive
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authority of other courts’ reasoning. If this trend continues, it
will have a real cost: a too-thoughtless pragmatism will have
trumped principled application of the underlying principle at
stake in Crawford. In a great many cases, the forensic evidence
against a defendant may in fact be the most powerful proof on
offer by the prosecution. Moreover, forensic science evidence
has, to some degree, been under attack for having significantly
less rigorous scientific foundations than most would presume,
and there have been more than a few recent scandals involving
overclaimed results or downright fraud. These forms of expert
testimony should not, for Confrontation Clause purposes, get a
free pass, or be presumed because of their subject matter to be
outside of Crawford’s dictates.
III. TOWARD A MORE NUANCED UNDERSTANDING OF
TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE AND ITS LIMITS IN THE CONTEXT OF
EXPERT TESTIMONY
What, then, is the alternative? One alternative is simple and
obvious: recognize certificates of analysis and the disclosure of
some basis evidence by experts as testimonial. While many
courts have attempted to find ways around Crawford’s seemingly
expansive approach to the Confrontation Clause, a minority of
courts have been willing to recognize that some expert basis
testimony or reports and documents prepared by experts are
indeed testimonial.84 In a sense, these courts’ analyses are
84

See, e.g., People v. Goldstein, 843 N.E. 2d 727 (Ct. App. N.Y.
2005); People v. Pena, 128 Cal. App. 4th 1219 (2005) (finding a statement
by a co-defendant that implied that an attack was gang related and implicating
members of a particular gang was admitted, and relied upon by expert, in
violation of Crawford ); People v. Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. Div.
2004) (finding a blood alcohol test done on a rape victim to be testimonial
and not admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule);
People v. Hernandez, 794 N.Y.S.2d 788 (Sup. Ct. 2005) (finding a report by
an unavailable latent fingerprint examiner to be testimonial and hence
excluded under Crawford); City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, 124 P.3d 203 (Nev.
2005 (finding the affidavit of a healthcare professional to be testimonial);
Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (finding the admission
of defendant’s breath test results without live testimony of officer who
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among the most straightforward. They often simply ask whether
the statement was a pretrial statement that the declarant would
reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially; if the answer is
affirmative, they find that Crawford applies.85 In addition,
several of these opinions have usefully and appropriately
challenged the assumption that seems to inform many of the
other cases; that cross-examination of the declarant who
conducted a routine laboratory test is unlikely to be helpful.86
In recognizing that such evidence is indeed testimonial, and
thus problematic under Crawford, these courts are initiating an
important line of analysis. They should be lauded for facing the
issues raised by Crawford head-on, for confronting
conducted test to violate Crawford); Shiver v. State, 900 So. 2d 615 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding an affidavit about a breath test to be
testimonial); Ohio v. Crager, 2005 Ohio 6868 (2005) (DNA test is
testimonial); Belvin v. State, 922 So. 2d 1046 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)
(portions of breath test affidavit pertaining to nontestifying breath test
technician’s procedures and observations in administering test were
testimonial hearsay requiring prior opportunity for cross-examination under
Crawford); State v. Carpenter, 882 A.2d 604 (Conn. 2005) (testimonial, but
introduction was harmless error); State v. Berezansky, 899 A.2d 306 (N.J.
Super Ct. 2006) (blood analysis testimonial).
85
See, e.g., State v. Crager, 844 N.E.2d 390 (2005) (DNA test is
testimonial because “a reasonable person could conclude that the report
would later be available for use at trial”); State v. Berezansky, 899 A.2d 306
(N.J. Super. Ct. 2006) (finding introduction of laboratory analysis of blood
without live testimony to be a Confrontation Clause violation because it was
introduced “to prove an element of the crime and offered in lieu of producing
the qualified individual who actually performed the test.”).
86
See, e.g., State v. Berezansky, 899 A.2d 306 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2006)
(noting that neither the neutrality nor the reliability of a state laboratory
analysis can be presumed); People v. Orpin, 796 N.Y.S.2d 512, 517 (Just.
Ct. 2005) (noting “the truth seeking value of cross-examination in this
context is not merely theoretical. Substantial problems with DWI testing in
this state were uncovered in the 1990s, and there have also been recent
problems even with reliability of the FBI laboratory’s analyses. Subjecting the
persons who conduct these calibration tests to the ‘crucible of cross
examination’ will help ensure the reliability of their work and protect the
integrity of the judicial system by avoiding convictions based on faulty breath
test results.”), collaterally attacked, Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772
(Sup. Ct. 2005).
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Confrontation Clause concerns without subterfuge. This
approach is without a doubt the most consistent with the
constitutional logic that underlies Crawford itself.
By contrast, as the previous Part showed, the great majority
of courts analyzing expert disclosure issues under Crawford are,
by hook or by crook, holding that these disclosures are not
testimonial under Crawford. To get there, they are sometimes
forced to make arguments that overreach any reasonable
interpretation of Crawford (e.g., the business records exception);
rely on distinctions that Crawford’s analysis suggests should not
be meaningful (e.g., objective/subjective; substituted crossexamination); or invent distinctions without logical foundation
(e.g., arguing that disclosure is not for the truth of its contents).
Unfortunately, the arguments on offer to evade Crawford are not
logically coherent, and sometimes even border on the
disingenuous. Furthermore, these solutions are reminiscent of
the very approach to the Confrontation Clause that Crawford
was attempting to eliminate—an effort to use categorical labels
without analysis as a substitute for the protection of the value of
cross-examination. It would seem, therefore, that testimonial
basis evidence and certificates of analysis ought to be prohibited
under this new approach to Confrontation.
And yet…
Perhaps there is still more to say. While recognizing that
some expert basis evidence and certificates of analysis do meet
any coherent definition of the testimonial, at the same time, it is
difficult not to sympathize with the frustration of the Kansas
Supreme Court in State v. Lackey at the thought of excluding an
autopsy report whose author had died before trial. Even if
general hand-waving in the direction of “impracticality” seems
strikingly inconsistent with Crawford’s bright-line rule approach,
the impulse to find some way around Crawford’s dictates, for at
least some subset of these cases, is not only strong, but
understandable.
One way to put the point is this: even if we must reject a
vague claim of impracticality as a justification for dispensing
with what Crawford seems otherwise to require, is there any
degree to which practicality and efficiency concerns do
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legitimately intersect with the Confrontation right? Are there
ever times when Confrontation should be dispensed with even
for evidence that is testimonial—either because it is practically
impossible or because it is highly inconvenient and extremely
unlikely to be useful, or both? This is one of Rehnquist’s chief
concerns in his concurrence: that the court has lost sight of the
link between cross-examination and likely accuracy; that “[b]y
creating an immutable category of excluded evidence, the Court
adds little to a trial’s truth-finding function.”87
The difficulty is that for the judge to make this decision—to
decide that this is a circumstance in which cross-examination is
unlikely to yield benefits or to increase accuracy appears to be
precisely what Crawford disallows: “Where testimonial
statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient
to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution
actually prescribes: confrontation.”88
So where are we left? If we return to the beginning, and
look at the kind of information that is problematic under
Crawford, just how impractical would it be to apply Crawford
strictly? How often would it be merely an inconvenience? What
are the circumstances in which it is likely to be not merely an
annoyance but a serious problem of proof? In what settings, if
any, is Crawford intellectually troubling if taken to its logical
extreme?
As I indicated in Part I, in most circumstances, complying
with Crawford would be an inconvenience, but no worse. It
would mean that the actual authors of forensic science reports
would have to testify about them in court in order to introduce
them into evidence. It would further mean that the use of
certificates of analysis would have to be substantially curtailed.
These would be inconveniences, to be sure, though in the many
cases in which the matters established by, say, a certificate of
analysis were uncontested, defendants might well frequently be
prepared to waive their confrontation clause rights and nothing
in Crawford suggests the impermissibility of waiver. While not
87
88

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 75.
Id. at 69.
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meaning to devalue the extent to which a strict application of
Crawford might be irritating both to prosecutors and forensic
scientists, to generally exempt these categories of evidence from
the category of the testimonial would be intellectually
unjustifiable under Crawford’s own logic.
To be sure, Rehnquist’s question—how much gain in
accuracy do we purchase through the application of this strict
rule?—is a fair one. But the ability to cross-examine the actual
creator of a forensic science report, for example, rather than
merely cross-examining another expert who has done no more
than eyeball the report, could well reveal additional weaknesses,
discrepancies, or other reasons to have less confidence in the
evidence than would otherwise have been apparent. There is no
reason to believe that the matters upon which experts rely ought
to be intrinsically exempt from Crawford’s dictates when they
are disclosed.
However, there are certain subcategories of evidence that
would be banned under this strict application that might make us
think that Crawford itself needs some kind of modification, lest
it become formalism without any clear benefit or purpose. Two
of these deserve particular mention.
First, one line of cases has struggled with whether certain
kinds of fairly routine, ministerial documentation ought to be
subject to Crawford. For example, breath test machines are
typically required by statute to be calibrated on a regular basis,
and when they are calibrated, the technician who does so
typically fills out a form certifying that the calibration has been
completed. Thus the issues arises: in a DUI case, can the
document certifying that the machine was properly calibrated be
admitted without giving the defendant the opportunity to
confront the human being who conducted the calibration? Does
it really make sense that the Constitution requires the prosecutor
to haul into court the technician who filled out this form, to
confirm that she did what the certificate claims? When we
require the person who is simply doing quality assurance tests
on the machinery to come into court for each and every DUI
trial, we may truly have gone too far.
Why so? What is the difference between calibrating an
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Intoxilyzer machine and conducting a DNA test? The most
salient distinction is that the former is done without a focus on
any particular case. As a number of courts have recognized,
while the records created to establish calibration are made in
expectation that they will be available for use in criminal trials,
they are not created with an eye to any particular trial, any
particular crime, or any particular defendant. This is in sharp
contrast to certificates reporting the result of a particular breath
test and the circumstances in which it was conducted. These,
unlike the calibration records, make an accusation. The
calibration evidence neither exculpates nor inculpates; it is,
rather, a foundational requirement statutorily required in order
to use the machine for evidentiary purposes.
In fact, almost all of the courts who have confronted breath
test calibration evidence have found it not to be testimonial.
Some of these courts have partly relied on some mixture of the
arguments described in the previous section. Several of these
arguments—such as the alleged business records exception to
Crawford, or the claim that because these are “objective”
findings rather than subjective—prove far too much. If those
arguments apply here, where do they stop, and why?
But a number of the opinions concerning calibration evidence
and other forms of routine, non-case specific documentation
have begun to develop a significantly more promising way
around Crawford in circumstances such as these, building on the
notion that the application of the Confrontation Clause, even
post-Crawford is limited to accusations against the defendant. If
evidence is developed not for any particular case, not with an
eye toward inculpating any particular defendant, but rather as
part of the routine quality control processes of law enforcement,
perhaps it is not appropriate to deem it “testimonial” in the first
place. Certainly breath test calibration certifications are made
with an eye toward the courtroom; it is not only foreseeable that
they will be used as evidence, but it is one of their most
important purposes. But as one court points out, “[u]nlike police
or prosecutorial interrogators, the technicians have no
demonstrable interest in whether the certifications produce
evidence that is favorable or adverse to a particular
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defendant.”89 The certifications are “not done for the purpose of
any particular prosecution.”90 They contain “the power to
exonerate as well as convict”—after all, the breath test can
exculpate only if it is in proper working order.91 They accuse no
one in particular of anything in particular, and in this sense they
are “neutral in character.”92 Indeed, these certifications often
pre-date the criminal act itself. If they lack an “accusatory
purpose,” then perhaps their use without the opportunity to
confront does not violate the Confrontation Clause.93
This line of argument is an intriguing method for potentially
limiting the Confrontation Clause’s reach. It is, of course, in
part a response to concerns about practicality, but it is a
response anchored within a framework for understanding the
purposes of confrontation, rather than using practicality as an
argument in its own right. Crawford itself does not suggest that
whether a statement is accusatory bears on whether it is
testimonial—indeed, the word “accusation” or “accusatorial”
does not appear in either Crawford or Davis.94 Nonetheless, this
is a potential direction in which the doctrine could develop that
could substantially be reconciled with Crawford’s present
structure.95 If the court made explicit that only evidence that was
89

State v. Norman, 125 P.3d 15, 19 (Or. Ct. App. 2005); see also
Michels v. Commonwealth, 624 S.E.2d 675 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
90
People v. Krueger, 804 N.Y.S.2d 908 (Just. Ct. 2005).
91
State v. Forte, 629 S.E.2d 137, 143 (N.C. 2006); see also
Commonwealth v. Walther, 189 S.W.3d 570, 575 (Ky. 2006).
92
Green v. DeMarco, 812 N.Y.S.2d 772, 783 (Sup. Ct. 2005).
93
People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 2005); see also, e.g.,
Bohsancurt v. Eisenberg, 129 P.3d 471 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006).
94
There are, however, numerous references in the opinion to
confronting one’s “accusers.” See generally, Crawford, 448 U.S. at 36.
95
For an argument in favor of an “accusatorial’” approach to the
Confrontation Clause, see §6371.2 of 30A Wright & Graham, Federal
Practice and Procedure: Evidence (Pocket Part, 2007), also available in draft
as Kenneth Graham, The Short(?) Happy(?) Life of Crawford v. Washington,
at http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1033&context=uc
lalaw); see also Robert P. Mosteller, “Testimonial” and the Formalistic
Definition—The Case for an “Accusatorial” Fix, 20 CRIM. JUST., Summer
2005, at 14.

MNOOKIN.DOC

7/11/2007 7:25 PM

EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CONFRONTATION

849

created to bear witness against the perpetrator of a particular
criminal act fit into the category of the testimonial, then these
calibration records could legitimately fall outside of the
Confrontation Clause’s purview. Limiting the Confrontation
Clause’s operation to accusations, broadly defined, would not be
inconsistent with the principles that underlie Crawford.
This approach would create a new set of questions
surrounding the definition of an accusation.96 Is a DNA test
determining that two samples match an accusation? What about
an autopsy report? Should accusations consist only of those
statements that literally accuse a specific person of an act, or
should they reach all testimonial evidence created for the
purpose of either adducing evidence useful for prosecuting a
particular trial or investigating a specific criminal act? Only the
latter, I would suggest, is justifiable; otherwise, Crawford’s
scope would be tremendously and unjustifiably narrowed.
(Imagine, for example, police interviews with victims of a
burglary, in which the victims describe what was taken, the state
of their home, et cetera, but make no literal accusation against a
specific person. Surely such statements should still be
testimonial; they are developed for the investigation of a
particular case, even if the statement does not accuse a named
human being of a criminal act. Similarly, forensic science
evidence produced for a specific case should be testimonial even
if, like an autopsy report, it may not accuse a particular person.)
Under such an appropriately broad definition, most laboratory
reports would still remain testimonial. But it would mean that
routine equipment checks and quality assurance methods
engaged in by forensic science laboratories could, depending on
statutory requirements, be introduced by certificate rather than
through live testimony notwithstanding the Confrontation Clause.
One could certainly argue against such a limitation to the
testimonial. After all, only if the machine is properly calibrated
can its test results be relied upon; indeed, considering how
96

For a sharply worded critique emphasizing the manipulability of the
idea of an accusation, see the dissenting opinion in Luginbyhl v.
Commonwealth, 628 S.E. 2d. 74, 81-82 (Va. Ct. App. 2006).
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automatic in operation breath test machines have become, the
chance to cross-examine about calibration could arguably seen
more important than the opportunity to cross-examine the person
who conducted the actual breath test. Breath tests themselves
have virtually become “black boxes”—an officer simply inputs a
driver’s license, the suspect breathes into the machine, and a
breath ticket pops out indicating the alcohol level found through
the test process. For the officer conducting such a test, there is
virtually no room for the exercise of discretion or judgment. 97
But this reported breath alcohol level will of course only be
accurate if the machine is properly calibrated and in working
order, so one could argue that issues of maintenance and
calibration are at least as salient as the particular result spit out
by the machine.
My purpose here, however, is not to argue whether
calibration records ought to fall within or outside the boundaries
of the testimonial. Rather, I simply wish to show that this is one
place where there is an intellectually viable argument for
excluding them from the definition of the testimonial—and to
suggest that if we believe that they ought to be excluded from
Confrontation Clause protections, it would be far better to
develop a principled limitation to Crawford than to jimmy up a
general business records exception that makes no intellectual
sense.
The second, and frankly still more concerning, circumstance
under Crawford occurs when the maker of a forensic science
report is genuinely unavailable. While it may be troubling to
have the prosecutor elect not to call the expert who conducted
the test, how ought the analysis to change if the expert is no
longer living, or no longer works for the laboratory in question?
When the expert is genuinely unavailable through no fault of the
prosecution, exclusion of the test under the Confrontation Clause
because of the defendant’s inability to confront its maker might
seem an excessively strict interpretation of what the Constitution
This description applies, for example, to the BAC Datamaster breath
testing machines which are used in Los Angeles County. Thanks are due to
Barry Fisher and Catherine Navetta of the Los Angeles County Crime
Laboratory for showing me how these machines operate.
97
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requires. This is especially so when the test has been conducted
far enough in the past (such as, for example, an autopsy
conducted years before the suspect was apprehended) that even
were she available, the expert who conducted it is very unlikely
to have any independent memory of what he or she put to paper
so long ago. In this circumstance, cross-examination is unlikely
to be particularly fruitful; the initial test was conducted in
circumstances that give little reason for fabrication; and other
experts can at least report on the plausibility of the finding and
their appropriate interpretation.
Let us return to the example of an autopsy conducted in the
distant past. Imagine, for example, an autopsy appropriately
conducted by the medical examiner, and further imagine that key
findings are not only reported on but carefully measured,
documented, and photographed. Now imagine that a decade
passes, or even longer, and a suspect is finally located.
Meanwhile, the medical examiner has died. Frankly, even were
she still living, how likely is it that she would have a usefully
specific memory of conducting that autopsy, separate from what
she had recorded? In addition, the careful documentation can be
interpreted by other qualified experts, perhaps almost as well as
she would have been able to interpret it herself. When (1) the
expert is truly unavailable; (2) even if the expert were available,
it is not likely that she would have an independent memory of
what she recorded; and (3) the evidence was created in
circumstances that suggest its likely (though of course not
certain) trustworthiness, does Crawford truly mean that we must
nonetheless exclude this test? Must the autopsy conducted a
decade or two earlier by a now-deceased medical examiner
actually be excluded?
This result would indeed seem troubling. The autopsy report
is the best present evidence we have about the cause and
circumstances of the victim’s death. There is no way to conduct
the test again at the present time. And the reason that so much
time has passed—increasing the odds of both the unavailability
of the medical examiner and the lack of memory even were she
available—is precisely because the perpetrator has managed to
evade the law.
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And yet the autopsy report, unlike the calibration records,
really does squarely fit into the category of the testimonial. This
cannot and should not be doubted. It is created as part of an
ongoing investigation in order to produce evidence. It is
prepared with an eye toward future criminal prosecution.
Though we may not know at the time it is conducted against
whom it will serve as testimony, it is meant to serve as
testimony against someone in particular, the perpetrator of the
murder. If it is introduced without the testimony of the person
who created it, the report is indeed being used as a surrogate for
testimony.
To be sure, most courts confronting autopsy reports are
electing not to deem them testimonial, again, largely by using a
business records exception or deciding that objective findings are
not subject to Crawford. The Court has thus far rejected several
certiorari petitions on precisely the question of whether autopsy
reports are testimonial; eventually, however, this is certainly an
issue that will have to be confronted (no pun intended).
If the Court is unwilling to create a general business records
exception to Crawford (as it should be, for this would mark a
return to the ad hoc, fiction-filled approach that is precisely
what the Court was trying to leave behind in the move away
from Ohio v. Roberts), what are the plausible alternatives? One
possibility is for some other expert to rely upon the report but
not disclose it—to provide conclusions about the cause of death
but not evidence-based reasons in support of these conclusions.
While this might fulfill the letter of Crawford, it would be an
unfortunate result: the jury would be deprived of any access to a
form of evidence that is far more detailed and precise than the
testifying expert’s conclusions. Moreover, the expert’s opinion
would only be warranted if the report itself was warranted; so if
the report is inadmissible as testimonial hearsay, it is not
altogether clear we should permit reliance upon it as a sole
source of information.
What else might we do? Crawford itself raises and then
appears to reject the possibility of a special exception for
coroner statements: the opinion notes, “There is some question
whether the requirement of a prior opportunity for cross-
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examination applied as well to statements taken by a coroner,
which were also authorized by the Marian statutes. . . Whatever
the English rule, several early American authorities flatly
rejected any special status for coroner statements.”98
The autopsy example forces us to consider whether despite
what Crawford says, there ought ever to be circumstances in
which unavailability and necessity should continue to play a role
in Confrontation Clause analysis. Perhaps there ought to be a
kind of “best evidence” rationale for continuing to permit the
autopsy report even when its creator is unavailable.99 Under this
rationale, when the person who conducted a forensic test is
unavailable to testify, the first step ought to be to have someone
conduct a retest if it is technologically feasible. But when
retesting is not a viable alternative, ought there not to be some
way to use the original test in court notwithstanding the absence
of its creator?
98

Crawford at 46. Indeed, one of the cases discussed in Crawford, State
v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. 124 (1844) deals explicitly with information received
at a coroner’s inquest. The question was whether testimony taken by the
coroner and put into writing can be introduced at trial without the declarant’s
presence, and the opinion answers in the negative on Confrontation Clause
grounds. To a certain extent, this case is not apropos: the issue is not
whether the coroner need testify, but rather whether the declarant must. But
it would be interesting to know whether physical findings by the coroner and
reported upon were able to be introduced at common law without the coroner
himself. In other words, one possible “out” for some of these scenarios might
possibly be a turn to history. Perhaps coroner’s physical findings (rather than
reports of what others said at an inquest) were permitted even when the
coroner did not testify.
However, whatever the history showed, there would be something deeply
odd about taking an originalist approach in this situation. The kinds of
physical observations available to a nineteenth century coroner are so
dramatically different from the kinds of scientific findings offered by forensic
scientists today that it is far from clear that even if one generally approved of
originalism as a method for answering such questions of constitutional scope,
this would be a circumstance where viewing our past traditions as binding our
present understanding was appropriate.
99
For an argument suggesting the centrality of a best evidence principle
undergirding evidence law, see generally Dale A. Nance, The Best of
Evidence Principle, 73 IOWA L. REV. 227 (1988).
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I will suggest two possible options. First, perhaps we could
create the possibility for some kind of pre-trial crossexamination of the medical examiner. Perhaps after autopsies in
which the cause of death is found to be murder, there could be a
public opportunity for a cross-examination of the medical
examiner who conducted the tests. To be sure, most of the time,
if no one had yet been charged in the case, it is unlikely that
anyone would come forward to conduct a cross-examination! But
perhaps the creation of this pre-trial opportunity, coupled with
unavailability of the medical examiner at trial, would suffice
under Crawford to permit the use of the records.100
Alternatively, and in my view better, especially given the
problem of the lack of an actual defendant at the time of the
hearing, we can imagine a narrowly drawn necessity exception
to the Confrontation Clause in circumstances such as these.
What if, upon a showing of necessity, the prosecutor were
permitted to use a substitute expert to interpret autopsy report
and present it to the jury? The use of the substitute expert could
be subject to a jury instruction informing jurors that they were
free to consider the lack of an opportunity to hear directly from
the writer of the report in assessing the credibility of the
contents of the report.101 To my mind, this is the more appealing
approach, because it responds directly to the nature of the expert
evidence and avoids the partly fictional nature of a preliminary
opportunity to cross-examine. With a detailed autopsy, in which
all findings were both carefully documented, recorded,
measured, and photographed, a substitute expert really is a
reasonable second-best solution—especially given that the
100

For an argument suggesting the use of such a mechanism in domestic
violence prosecutions, see Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747, 791-94 (2005). Of course, in domestic
violence cases, there is not typically any question about the identity of the
alleged perpetrator.
101
The jury would, of course, be free to consider this point even without
a jury instruction saying so, and in any event it is not clear that jury
instructions make a great deal of difference. But at the margins, pointing out
the unavailability of the original declarant might usefully remind jurors to
asses the evidence with a critical eye.
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original expert is not likely to have a significant actual memory
of the tests anyway. This procedure would protect the
Confrontation right by requiring the prosecutor to use the
forensic expert or medical examiner who conducted the test
whenever it is possible to do so, but would permit crossexamination of another expert when there was no feasible
alternative. This approach would not permit prosecutors to game
the system by choosing their most courtroom-friendly
technicians instead of the ones who actually conducted a
particular test. But it would, at the same time, allow some
degree of practical flexibility in order to continue to put the best
available evidence before the factfinder in criminal prosecutions.
This approach, to be sure, is not overtly justified by
Crawford and Davis, which at present provide no space for
considerations of necessity, unavailability, or reliability. Staunch
advocates of Crawford’s new regime might therefore resist such
a move, as it takes a definite, if limited, step back toward the
very ideas that Crawford has left behind. But recognizing some
kind of necessity exception for evidence that, because of its
expert nature and because of the way that it has been carefully
memorialized by the original expert, truly can, to a substantial if
imperfect extent, be adequately interpreted by a surrogate expert
would be a reasonable way to continue to permit autopsies and
forensic findings (that cannot be retested), even in the absence
of the original tester. This approach would represent a narrowly
drawn and intellectually honest approach to the problem. It
would recognize correctly that autopsies and other forensic
science reports are indeed testimonial. It would establish a
preference for hearing in court from the declarant when
possible. But it would also allow a second best solution when it
was both necessary and justifiable. Surely a narrowly drawn,
necessity-based, exception to Crawford’s prohibition on
testimonial evidence would be more jurisprudentially justifiable
than general and vague pronouncements about practicality, or
claims of a general (and unjustified) business records exception
to the Confrontation Clause, or, still worse, the wholly
nonsensical fiction that expert basis evidence is introduced for an
ostensibly non-hearsay purpose.
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CONCLUSION
More than two years have now passed since the Supreme
Court dramatically recast its orientation to the Confrontation
Clause in Crawford. What is most striking in the context of
those expert evidence issues that intersect with the Confrontation
Clause is just how resistant lower courts have been to taking
Crawford at face value. A significant majority of those courts
faced with questions about the admissibility of either certificates
of analysis or basis evidence that is produced with an eye toward
testimony by a person not present in court have resorted to
strained and dubious arguments in order to avoid restricting
these forms of proof.
The Court may well not at all have had the implications for
forensic science evidence in mind when it decided Crawford. It
is certainly possible that the justices did not intend to effect
change in how these forms of evidence were handled at trial.
But the logic underlying Crawford simply cannot justify a
wholesale exemption of these forms of proof from the category
of the testimonial. If it looks like a duck, quacks like a duck,
and swims like a duck, one ought to have a very good
justification for determining that the aquatic beast in question is
not a duck after all. Unfortunately, most of the arguments that
courts have put forward simply do not succeed in offering
coherent or logical ways to justify treating forensic science
reports, other kinds of expert basis evidence produced in
circumstances suggesting their possible use as future testimony,
or certificates of analysis, as non-testimonial.
The argument that basis evidence is being introduced for the
non-hearsay purpose of helping the jury assess the expert fails to
recognize that this allegedly non-hearsay purpose necessarily
requires a preliminary assessment of the likely truth of the
underlying matter. How can I use the basis evidence for
assessing the expert without first assessing whether the basis
evidence itself is worthy of credence? The fact that I may build
on this first inference about the quality of the basis evidence in
order to make a second inference about the quality of the
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expert’s conclusions does not at all mean that my use of the
basis evidence is for a purpose other than the truth of its
contents. This approach either misunderstands the definitions of
hearsay, misunderstands the nature of inferential thought, or
both. Only if a court can actually detail a line of reasoning for
which the basis evidence is useful that does not require a
preliminary determination of its truth ought the courts to be able
to resort to this argument; at least until now, no court has
succeeded in doing so.
The argument that there is a per se business records
exception to Crawford defies the decision’s internal logic.
Simply because most business records are not testimonial ought
not to mean that those few that do that fit the category are
nonetheless exempt simply because they also fit the contours of
that hearsay exception.
While Crawford does lead to some practical difficulties,
these may often not be so severe as is feared by courts and
prosecutors understandably anxious about change. And even if
Crawford is impractical, this does not justify the lower courts in
ignoring its dictates. To be sure, in those limited instances when
Crawford may create significant logistical and practical
difficulties that threaten our process of proof, there may be an
argument for limiting or rethinking Crawford’s boundaries, but
this ought to be done both carefully and coherently, not simply
based on general and sometimes overstated anxieties about
practicality.
Arguing that testimony from a substitute expert witness
avoids a Crawford problem is similarly problematic. Quite
clearly Crawford prohibits testimonial substitutes in the nonexpert context. A police interrogator’s in-court testimony cannot
possibly justify the admission of testimonial statements by the
person interrogated, nor, more generally, can testimonial
hearsay become admissible just because someone with
knowledge relevant to the testimonial statement other than the
declarant takes the stand. If cross-examination of a substitute
expert is ever to be an option, it must depend on some
meaningful ways in which expert evidence is distinct from other
kinds of proof; otherwise, such a rule would virtually swallow
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Crawford whole.
Similarly, the effort to exclude “objective” findings from
Crawford’s purview is not satisfactory. Plenty of non-expert
observations are descriptive and non-analytical; indeed, as a
general matter, the rules of evidence exhibit a strong preference
for factual descriptions by percipient witnesses rather than
interpretations and opinions. If there is something distinct about
forensic science reports that might warrant thinking about
confrontation issues differently in this context, it cannot simply
be that they are fact-based or facially objective. Moreover,
delegating to judges the task of separating factual findings from
interpretive ones goes deeply against the grain of Crawford’s
reasoning. Precisely the arguments through which Crawford
resists permitting judges to make determinations about reliability
as the basis for determining whether confrontation is required
would caution equally strongly against asking courts to
distinguish factual claims from interpretive ones to decide
whether the need for confrontation applies.
I claim, therefore, that none of these arguments succeeds as
a justification for finding these kinds of expert evidence to be
non-testimonial. There is, however, one argument that a number
of lower courts have offered that is more successful. Sometimes
the evidence at issue has been produced in a setting in which it
can be fairly understood as non-accusatorial. When a technician
fills out a report certifying that she has calibrated a particular
piece of machinery, or a former gang member describes general
contextual information about the structure of the gang to a police
detective outside of the confines of a particular case, it is, I
think, fair to view this information as non-testimonial, even
though the words were spoken or written with the clear
knowledge that they might be useful for testimony at some point
in the future. The salient difference in these settings and
analogous ones is that the statements at issue do not relate
simply to a particular case or incident, but rather, have a
significantly more abstracted and attenuated quality. While they
could potentially be relevant to any number of future cases,
these statements were not made with a view toward any one case
in particular or any definable instance of wrongdoing. Crawford,
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to be sure, does not make this question of whether a statement is
accusatorial explicitly relevant to its analysis of what is
testimonial. But a limit on the Confrontation Clause that
emphasized that only accusations, broadly understood, were
subject to its confines, could be grafted onto Crawford without
any great difficulty or loss of internal coherence. While this
modification would eliminate a number of more ministerial kinds
of expert documents from Crawford’s purview, let me be clear:
the vast majority of otherwise testimonial expert basis evidence
and many certificates of analysis could not be excluded from the
definition of the testimonial on this ground.
Apart from this possible limitation, I would argue that
testimonial expert evidence should be recognized as testimonial.
That sounds tautological, even obvious. And yet, far too many
courts have refused to recognize the point. There is simply no
reason why any of these forms of expert evidence should get a
free pass, or be understood as obviously exempt from the
Confrontation Clause’s purview. Indeed, often forensic science
evidence will be the strongest evidence offered against a
defendant; if we take confrontation values seriously, this may in
fact be an especially important site in which to assure that the
defendant has the possibility for cross-examination.
That said, there may still be both reasons and possible
methods for dispensing with the confrontation right in some
circumstances. With certificates of analysis, an important
question ought to be whether some waiver procedures ought to
pass constitutional muster. Though I have not considered that
issue in any detail, it is certainly true that there are many cases
in which the key issue at trial does not at all relate to the
reliability of the forensic evidence. To require live testimony in
every case, even when both parties agree on the forensic science
facts, may well be a significant waste of resources. Stipulations
can, of course, be one way around this issue. But it may make
sense to go further: waiver procedures that would let the
prosecutor use a certificate of analysis unless the defendant
requests otherwise could offer a practical way to both permit
and limit the use of such certificates without any testimony.
However, the burden imposed on the defendant by these waiver
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provisions ought to be minimized.
A second possible way to get around the limitations imposed
by Crawford would be to create additional pre-trial mechanisms
for cross-examination. If this made sense anywhere, it would
likely be in the context of autopsies, in which there may
frequently be a significant passage of time between the autopsy
of a victim and the indictment of a defendant in the case. After
an autopsy found that the cause of death was murder, there
could be notice of a public hearing in which the medical
examiner would be available for cross-examination. Would
anyone representing an uncharged suspect show up at these
hearings? Probably not, but so be it. By merely creating the
opportunity, the prosecution could argue that the medical
examiner’s report should be admissible at trial, should the
medical examiner herself turn out to be available.
This potential procedural innovation is, however, more
clever than useful. It could possibly pass constitutional muster
under Crawford, but it is an inelegant solution. In practical
terms, it would simply be make-work for medical examiners,
while providing little actual possibility of confrontation for
defendants who were charged at some point subsequent to the
hearing, and who might not even have been suspects at the point
when the hearing occurred. To be sure, there is no particular
reason to feel sorry for the guilty defendant who did not avail
herself of the opportunity to cross-examine at this pretrial
hearing because, at the time of the hearing, she had still evaded
justice or even suspicion, but this pre-trial mechanism would
offer little assistance to the subsequently-charged innocent
defendant either.
The better solution would be a narrowly drawn exception to
Crawford in circumstances that meet three conditions. When (1)
the expert who conducted the original test is legitimately
unavailable; (2) the expert memorialized the results of the
original test in a form that another expert in the field can
reasonably understand and interpret; and (3) a retest by an
available scientist is infeasible, then the courts should permit a
qualified substitute expert to disclose and to interpret the original
results for the jury, even though the report itself is testimonial.
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This solution appropriately balances the defendant’s
constitutional interest in confrontation with the public interest in
accurate adjudication. It prevents the state from cherry-picking
the forensic experts it uses for testimony, or from offering
critical evidence without any testimony at all. It also recognizes
that substitute experts are only a second-best solution; when
possible, the defendant ought to be given the opportunity to
cross-examine the experts who actually produced the report. But
it also recognizes that substitute experts are a second-best
solution. Especially when considerable time elapses between test
and testimony, the actual expert who did conduct the test is
likely to lack an independent memory of the tests administered.
To be sure, this will sometimes hold true for non-experts as
well: a witness to a crime who makes a statement shortly
thereafter may, by the time of trial, have little memory of what
occurred apart from what is captured by the statement itself. But
in the expert context, a substitute witness with adequate training
will typically be able to use her expertise usefully to interpret
the results documented by the original expert⎯perhaps not quite
as well as the original creator of the report, but well enough that
we should permit it when necessary. Part of what makes
someone expert in the relevant forensic field is precisely that
they have had training in how to produce and interpret such
reports. Note that I am neither assuming nor presuming the
reliability of forensic science evidence⎯there have been far too
many incidents of both innocent error and malfeasance in the
forensic sciences for their reliability simply to be taken as a
given. But the shared procedures and routines for documentation
of results within a particular laboratory ought, at least in
principle, to make a substitute expert a reasonable interpreter of
a forensic science report when, and only when, the actual
creator is unavailable.
This proposed solution does reflect a certain degree of
backpedaling⎯a small move away from Crawford, and back
toward the dual foci of necessity and reliability that Crawford
ostensibly left behind. It also injects into Crawford’s formalism
a degree of functionalist analysis⎯but Davis, in quite a different
context, has already begun to add functionalist inquiries (e.g.,
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what was the primary purpose of the statement?) to the
Confrontation Clause inquiry. As a practical matter, it is almost
unthinkable that courts will be prepared to exclude the autopsy
report from long ago, written by an expert now truly
unavailable. The real question is not whether most courts will
find some way to permit such evidence⎯for they almost
certainly will⎯but whether the courts will make careful and
intellectually justifiable distinctions in order to permit under the
Confrontation Clause a limited amount of testimonial evidence in
delineated circumstances. If they choose instead to rely, for
example, on the fiction that expert basis evidence is not hearsay,
or to invent a generalized business records exception to the
Confrontation Clause, they will be making use of the same kinds
of inelegant, ad hoc, and jerry-rigged doctrinal creations that
prompted Crawford itself. That would be both avoidable and a
shame.

